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Any tax that produces revenue will in some way alter the social and economic order.
-Randolph
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I. INTRODUCTION
Academics and policymakers pay little attention to the
interaction of a tax system with the objectives of a just government.
For example, in the debate about whether the United States should
retain an income tax or adopt a consumption tax, most discussions
focus on the relative efficiency and equity of the taxes. Proponents of a
consumption tax worry that an income tax is inefficient because it
burdens investment income. Advocates of an income tax fear that a
consumption tax is not equitable because low-income taxpayers
consume a greater percentage of their income than wealthy taxpayers.
These concerns date at least as far back as Thomas Hobbes 2 and John
4
Stuart Mill 3 and continue into the twenty-first century.
The difficulty in comparing these concerns is that efficiency
gains can be quantified, but the benefits of tax equity appear
1.
RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION FOR PROSPERITY 214 (1947).
2.
See THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 386-87 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books
1968) (1651) ("For what reason is there for he which laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of
").
his labour, consumeth little, should be more charged ....
3.
See JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY bk. V, ch. 2 (W.J. Ashley
ed., Longmens, Green & Co. 1923) (1871) ('The subjects of every state ought to contribute to the
support of the government, as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities: that
is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state. In
the observation or neglect of this maxim consists what is called the equality or inequality of
taxation.").
4.
See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal
Consumption Tax Over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1414 (2006) (arguing that a
consumption tax is more efficient than an ideal income tax).
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intangible and difficult to measure. 5 Moreover, the many different
views of distributive justice obscure equity's importance because of
disagreement about equity's underlying rationale. The failure to agree
about a rationale for tax equity causes it to appear less well-defined
and worthy than tax efficiency.
A leading tax academic has described tax policy's failed search
for an appropriate rationale for equity as a search for the turtle on
which all other turtles rest. 6 This Article suggests that the failure is
the result of an improper method of analysis. Tax policy has ignored
the necessity of first identifying equity goals appropriate for a just
government and then designing a tax system to help achieve those
goals. This Article proposes that the principal equity goal underlying a
just government is the creation of equal opportunities for all citizens
to achieve self-realization-to make the best life for themselves and
their families. However, a tax system should not merely be evaluated
for its contribution to achieving equal opportunity for self-realization.
A tax should be designed to achieve equal opportunity for selfrealization as one of its principal goals. Viewing equal opportunity for
self-realization as a design issue leads to the identification of another
principle that is foundational-the promotion of democracy. Both
political philosophy and empirical literature suggest that equal access
to the electoral process and participation in the community must exist
in order for equal opportunity for self-realization to exist. Thus, the
turtle lying at the bottom is equality of opportunity-equality of
opportunity to maximize self-realization and equality of opportunity to
participate in the political process.
Designing a tax system to maximize these opportunities
eliminates the uncertainty inherent in prior approaches that defined
equity by reference either to benefits conferred by the government on
the taxpayer or to the taxpayer's ability to pay. A design focused on
achieving equality of opportunity for self-realization and participation
in the democratic process need not measure a taxpayer's increase in
See Joseph M. Dodge, Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit, Partnership,
5.
and Ability-to-Pay Principles, 58 TAX L. REV. 399, 410 n.40 (2005) (stating that attempts to
compare efficiency to equity are similar to attempts to compare apples to oranges); see also CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 70-107 (1997) (observing that, since human

goods cannot be measured using a common index, social decisions cannot be based solely on
quantitative factors).
6.
Daniel N. Shaviro, Commentary: Inequality, Wealth, and Endowment, 53 TAX L. REV.
397, 398-99 (2000) ("Inequality therefore plays an important role in a variety of views of
distributive justice, although under any it rests at least one turtle from the bottom."). The
"turtle" metaphor traces its roots to Hindu mythology in which the universe is portrayed as
resting on the back of a giant tortoise. See Roger C. Cramton, Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75
GEO. L.J. 1, 2 n.4 (1986) (describing the source of the "turtle" story).
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utility as the result of government benefits or a taxpayer's decrease in
utility in an attempt to impose equal sacrifices. Instead, the design
should ensure that the tax burden on disadvantaged taxpayers is
sufficiently low so that it does not harm their opportunity for selfrealization. It also should ensure that the tax burden on advantaged
taxpayers is sufficiently high to provide the revenues needed to permit
a low burden for the disadvantaged and to burden the
disproportionate political power of the advantaged.
To illustrate the importance of designing a tax system based on
these principles of equity, this Article revisits the debate about the
desirability of an income tax versus a consumption tax. It is well
understood that democracy is an inefficient form of government in the
short term, but is the most successful in the long term. The same is
true for an income tax. Advocates of a consumption tax assert that
investment income should not be taxed in order to maximize
efficiency. However, an income tax that burdens investment income
makes contributions to the effective operation of our democracy and to
the creation of equal opportunity that are more important than any
efficiency gains provided by a consumption tax. Indeed, as discussed in
this Article, the relative efficiencies of the two types of tax systems,
while clear in an idealized world, are far less clear in the real world. A
tax system designed to maximize opportunities for self-realization and
participation in democracy provides benefits that previously have been
ignored in evaluating tax systems. In contrast, a consumption tax
designed to deal with transition and distributive issues likely to arise
in the real world may be no more efficient than the income tax that it
would replace.
Part II of this Article reviews the debate about the appropriate
design for a tax system in the United States. It explains that,
although there has been broad agreement that equity is needed in a
tax system, disagreement continues about the goals that equity should
achieve. Part III proposes that an important goal for the design of a
tax is the establishment of conditions that provide equal opportunity
for all citizens to achieve self-realization. Opportunity for selfrealization in turn requires that a tax system's design contribute to
the creation of conditions that enable all citizens to participate equally
in democracy. Designing a tax system to achieve these goals not only
will increase equity, but also will provide efficiency gains that analysts
have not considered previously. In Part IV, the Article demonstrates
that a progressive income tax with limitations on loss deductions is
better than an ideal consumption tax in establishing the conditions for
equal opportunity for self-realization and democracy because it
burdens investment income, which is an important source of political
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power. The claim that a consumption tax can limit the excess political
power of the wealthy in the same way as an income tax is incorrect
because the wealthy consume only a small percentage of their income,
and a consumption tax burdens investment income only in narrow
situations. Lastly, Part V analyzes other aspects of the efficiency and
equity claims for the two forms of taxes. It argues that the efficiency
claims for an ideal consumption tax versus our existing income tax are
overstated when viewed in the context of real world systems that
account for taxpayer behavior and transition relief. Given the
uncertain efficiency gains of the consumption tax and the potential
efficiency gains of a progressive income tax, the equity goals discussed
herein should govern the selection of a tax system. Such equity goals
weigh heavily in favor of a progressive income tax.
II. THE DEBATE

A. An Introduction to Theories of Tax Justice
The moral aspects of various tax systems have been central to
the debate about tax systems. Underlying the clash of perspectives are
7
different value judgments about what is most important for society.
Thomas Hobbes advocated a consumption tax because he felt that
taxpayers should be taxed on goods that they withdraw from the
common stock.8 Hobbes's view represents a value judgment that
consumption should be discouraged because it withdraws resources
that could be used for the common good. 9
Similarly, Nicholas Kaldor argues that a consumption tax is
fairer than an income tax because an income tax does not affect
wealthy taxpayers who choose to consume principal rather than invest
it and consume income. 10 This argument also reflects a value
judgment about the relative merits of spending principal versus
spending income generated by that principal.

7.
See, e.g., Richard A. Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARv. L. REV. 44,
46 (1957) ("The choice [between an income tax and consumption tax] is essentially one of value
judgment.").
8. HOBBES, supra note 2, at 387 ("[E]very man payeth Equally for what he useth .
.
9.
See, e.g., INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT
TAXATION: REPORT OF A COMMITTEE CHAIRED BY PROFESSOR J.E. MEADE 33 (1978) (defining

consumption as personal appropriation of the community's productive resources); William D.
Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 314-15 (1972)
(defining consumption as private preclusive use of resources).
10.

NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX 14, 53 (1955).
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Others have asserted that distributive justice is an important
consideration in the debate. For example, Louis Kaplow and Steven
Shavell argue that our tax and transfer systems should be the
principal tool for accomplishing fairness, whereas the focus of all other
legal rules should be efficiency.'1 Edward McCaffery asserts that a tax
system must be fair and just and that justice requires an individuated
tax that is "based on ability to pay or benefits received or some such
principle."'12 Professor McCaffery states:
[A] persuasive case can be made out under both liberal egalitarian theories, such as
those of John Rawls, and utilitarian or welfarist conceptions of justice, that, at least
given fair and efficient markets,
the tax system is the best or even the only place to
13
redistribute material resources.

This understanding has guided U.S. tax policy for the past
century. A head tax would maximize efficiency in our tax system. Yet
policymakers and most participants in the debate would agree that a
head tax is not desirable because of its distributive effects. There was,
and still is, broad agreement that using the tax system for
redistribution is an important element of tax equity.'4 For example, in
justifying the imposition of a heavier tax burden on the rich, President
Theodore Roosevelt said, "The man of great wealth owes a peculiar
obligation to the State, because he derives special advantages from the
mere existence of government."'15 Similarly, polls show that a majority
of respondents favor a progressive rate structure that requires the rich
to pay a greater percentage of their income in taxes.' 6 Unfortunately,
this agreement does not extend to how to design a tax system. That
debate has been vague and unproductive because of disagreement
11. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income
Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 668 (1994); cf. William Sanchirico,
Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1005 (2001) (arguing
against the "practice of evaluating legal rules solely on the basis of the efficiency criterion," and
asserting that "these arguments are alternatively logically flawed or reliant on untenable
assumptions"); Kyle Logue & Ronen Avrahan, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules-Legal
Rules and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157, 165 (2003) (arguing that the determination whether
the tax system or legal rules should be used to achieve redistribution is a contextual inquiry).
12. Edward McCaffery, A New Understandingof Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 830-31 (2005).
13. Id. at 831.
14. It is interesting to note that this agreement existed in the world's first democracy,
Athens, which had a progressive tax. See Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Democracy, Equality and
Taxes, 54 ALA. L. REV. 415, 461 (2003) ("Significant features of Athenian democracy were made
possible because taxes were imposed on the property of the wealthiest of its citizens ....
").
15. 59 CONG. REC. 27 (1906) (statement of Theodore Roosevelt). For an excellent review of
the history of views on progressivity in the United States, see Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Equity
Versus Efficiency and the U.S. Tax System in HistoricalPerspective, in TAX JUSTICE 26 (Joseph J.
Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. eds., 2002) (summarizing perspectives).
16. KARLYN H. BOWIAN, AM. ENTER. INST., PUBLIC OPINION ON TAXES 2 (last updated Apr.
6, 2007), http://www.aei.orgldocLib/ 20050415_TAXES.pdf.
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about theories of distributive justice that justify progressivity in the
tax system and the selection of a tax base. Daniel Shaviro argues that
the quest for an appropriate tax base has been hampered by the fact
that each base is a crude proxy for some underlying and poorly
articulated theory of distributive justice. Professor Shaviro says:
[N]either "wealth" nor "income" nor "consumption" plausibly can be what we really want
to tax. Rather, the defense of any of these bases must lie in its capacity to provide a
crude proxy for something else that is relevant to distributive justice but cannot be
directly observed.
What is this other underlying thing? While unlikely to be the subject of universal
agreement, it has something to do with inequality. After all, to the extent benefit
taxation is unfeasible, there presumably would be no objection to raising all government
revenues through a uniform head tax but for the idea that those who are better-off
should bear greater burdens. Inequality therefore plays an important role in a variety of
views of distributive justice, although under any it rests at least one turtle from the
bottom. The move from a description of who is better-off under some metric to the claim
that tax burdens should vary by reason of the differences that this metric identifies
requires motivation....
Writers in the income tax literature have often recognized the conceptual need for a
lower-lying distributional "turtle" than the Haig-Simons (or any competing) income
definition itself. The true but unobservable underlying measure that, for reasons lying
at least one more turtle down, income tries to implement often goes by the name of
"ability" or "ability to pay." The spirit, however, in which this hypothetical measure
typically is discussed (or, rather, deliberately not discussed) was well illustrated by
Henry Simons, when he argued that attempts to poke too far behind the supposed
objectivity of an income definition "lead directly back into the utter darkness of 'ability'
or 'faculty' or,
as it were, into a rambling, uncharted course pointed only by fickle
17
sentiments."

B. The Government Benefits Principle
Academics have formulated many principles in an attempt to
find the underlying rationale for tax policy. One approach has been to
tax an individual based on the benefits she receives from the
government.' 8 The tax represents consideration provided by the
17. Shaviro, supra note 6, at 398-99.
18. See, e.g.,
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 315-16 (1960) ("[S]ince
almost all economic activity benefits from the basic services of government, these services form a
more or less constant ingredient of all we consume and enjoy ... therefore a person who
commands more of the resources of society will also gain proportionally more from what the
government has contributed."); RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 239-42 (3d ed. 1980) ('Under a strict regime of benefit taxation, each
taxpayer would be taxed in line with his demand for public services."): Walter J. Blum & Harry
Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 452 (1952) ("The
relevant question is whether, granting that most benefits from government cannot be
particularized and traced, it nevertheless can be held that such benefits as a whole vary in some
fashion with income.").
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taxpayer for her "contract" with the government to protect her life,
liberty, and property. 19 To include all of the taxpayer's well-being in
the tax base (direct government benefits and taxpayer-generated
benefits), we might determine that all of the taxpayer's income is
attributable to the government because the government provides the
20
infrastructure that enables the taxpayer to earn a living.
Alternatively, we might decide that only a portion of a taxpayer's wellbeing is attributable to government benefits, but that a taxpayer's
amount of total welfare generally correlates with the amount of
government benefits received. 21 In either case, we could use each
taxpayer's current level of welfare as a measure of the benefits
conferred on that individual by government and seek to assess a tax
22
thereon.
However, evaluating the degree of each taxpayer's welfare
generated by the government is challenging. It requires establishing
the conditions that would exist without a government-something
that we have no experience with. Joseph Dodge observes:
The problem lies in trying to prove how much private wealth is attributable to
government and how much is attributable to private labor and capital. This task seems
hopeless, since there would be no private wealth (and no government funded by taxes)
without private capital and23labor, and there would be very little lasting "property"
wealth without government.

Moreover, the benefits approach suggests little about the tax
system's design. 24 It does not indicate the level of taxation because the
appropriate level of government expenditure or redistribution that
25
should be accomplished with the tax collected is not addressed.
While the contractarian nature of the benefits theory suggests that
19. See Dodge, supra note 5, at 402, 412 ("[1Taxation is the necessary 'cost' everybody pays
to secure the benefits of entering into the social contract.").
20. Hobbes described a world without government as a state of nature which entailed a war
of all against all. LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND
JUSTICE 16 (2002). Marjorie E. Kornhauser explains that "[t]he robust form of the [benefits
theory] ... states that the government plays a role-at least indirectly-in the creation of all
wealth and income because all private property is a 'legal convention.'" Marjorie E. Kornhauser,
Choosing a Tax Rate Structure in the Face of Disagreement, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1697, 1709 (2005).
21. See, e.g., Blum & Kalven, supra note 18, at 452 (noting that "there are many instances
of good correlation between a tax paid and a benefit received" but this logic extends only so far).
22. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 20, at 17. Professor Joseph Dodge refers to this type of
benefit theory as the "contractarian version of the benefit principle" to distinguish it from an
older benefit norm that only would have considered benefits received directly from the
government. Dodge, supranote 5, at 402.
23. Dodge, supra note 5, at 424.
24. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 20, at 18.
25. Id.; Dodge, supra note 5, at 430 ("[The new benefit principle, being a theory of
government entitlement to private wealth, cannot itself generate a top-down redistributive role
for government.").
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taxes should be collected commensurate to the benefits provided by
the government, it says nothing about the use of a tax system to
achieve distributive justice goals, except to the extent that one can
view distributive justice as being necessary to permit the government
to fulfill its obligations to protect life, liberty, and property. Indeed,
the benefits approach conflicts with any government that provides
welfare to indigents as a matter of moral policy. 26 For example, if one
governmental objective is to provide minimal income support and
health benefits, then the government should provide those items to
28
the indigent. 27 But the poor would have to be taxed for such benefits.
In a similar vein, the benefits approach does not provide
guidance about tax rates. 29 One justification for progressive tax rates
under the benefits approach is that the portion of government benefits
received by high-income taxpayers increases more rapidly than their
income. But it would be difficult to prove this justification. If the
benefits are derived from the government's protection of property, for
example, it seems unlikely that the costs of protecting property
increase more rapidly than the value of the property itself.3°
Another justification for progressive rates under the benefits
theory might be based on the declining marginal utility of money.
However, this justification requires additional decisions regarding tax
system design that are separate from the initial benefits-based
justification for the tax. One important decision would be whether the
tax should account for declining marginal utility in seeking to impose
equal burdens on taxpayers that receive the same amount of benefits.
For example, consider benefits that will be provided equally to
31
taxpayers and that have the same intrinsic value for each taxpayer.
A person who earns $10,000 per year might value one thousand units
of benefits conferred on him at $1,000 ($1 per unit). However, if we

26. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 20, at 18.
27. Id.
28. Id. Professor Dodge points out that the most recent version of the benefits theory, what
he calls "the new benefits theory," eliminates this problem by defining its scope to refer to only
government benefits that relate private wealth accumulations. Dodge, supra note 5, at 430-31.
29. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 20, at 17.
30. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 18, at 454 ("[The principle of progression requires not
merely that the benefits increase with income but that they increase more rapidly than
income."); see also Kornhauser, supra note 20, at 1708 (observing that the benefits theory lost
support in the late nineteenth century because of the belief that poor individuals received many
more benefits from the government than the rich). Kornhauser points out that if this were true, a
tax based on benefits could never be progressive. Id. But see 50 CONG. REC. 3835-36 (1913)
(statement of Senator Poindexter) (arguing for a progressive income tax rate on the grounds that
large fortunes resulted from special favors from the government, not from individual merit).
31. This example is based on MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 18, at 239.
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assume declining marginal utility, the same person now earning
$20,000 per year might value the one thousand units at $2,000 ($2 per
unit) or even $3000 ($3 per unit). (Because the taxpayer has a higher
income, the marginal value of each dollar has declined, and, therefore,
more dollars will be assigned to each unit of value.) In designing our
tax on benefits we need to decide whether our tax will impose equal
burdens (taking into account declining marginal utility) on benefits
received. If the tax is intended to impose equal burdens on taxpayers
using the dollar value of the benefits conferred, different tax rates will
be assessed depending on the taxpayer's income because of the
declining marginal utilities. In the case of the taxpayer with the
$20,000 income who valued the benefits at $2 per unit, we would
impose a tax proportional to her income, because doubling her income
caused her to double the dollar value of the benefits. If that taxpayer
valued the 1,000 units of benefits at $3000 ($3 per unit) when her
income was $20,000, we would impose a progressive rate that would
increase as her income increased. Note that the rationale for the
design of this system-the taxation of benefits-does not justify a
particular rate structure. 32 The decision to impose equal burdens and
the nature of the declining marginal utility determine the tax rate, not
the goal of taxing benefits.
The benefits approach also fails to identify the appropriate tax
base. Deborah Geier argues that income is the best measure of
government-provided benefits because the government maintains and
regulates the capitalist system that provides such income. 33 Professor
Dodge, however, has responded that consumption may be a better
measure:
Income tax advocates sometimes argue that income is a better measure of well-being
than consumption, on the theory that wealth confers utility above and beyond future
consumption .... It is true that wealth has value apart from consumption value; for
example, it can be used to influence family, friends, politicians, charities, subordinates,
and business associates. It is not clear, however, that it is legitimate to add the value of
such attributes to consumption value, because the
consumption of wealth precludes the
34
exercise of these other attributes and vice versa.

As discussed herein, I disagree with Professor Dodge's view
that it is inappropriate to add political power to consumption power in
constructing a tax base. Nevertheless, I agree that the benefits theory,
standing alone, does not provide a rationale for selecting one tax base
over another.
32. Id. at 239-40; see MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 20, at 17.
33. Deborah A. Geier, Incremental Versus Fundamental Tax Reform and the Top One
Percent, 56 SMU L. REV. 99, 119 (2003).
34. Dodge, supra note 5, at 435 n.135.
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C. The Ability-to-Pay Principleand Equal Burdens
Another approach to designing a tax is to base it on each
taxpayer's ability to pay. 35 Under an ability-to-pay approach, higherincome taxpayers are expected to pay higher amounts of taxes. The
ability-to-pay principle overlaps with the benefits approach in that
wealthy individuals who are more able to pay taxes also may be
viewed as having benefited more from government programs than
people who are less wealthy. 36 However, the two approaches could
result in different tax bases. For example, the ability-to-pay approach
exempts benefits provided to low-income individuals, whereas the
benefits doctrine does not. Some suggest that an ability-to-pay tax
should be based on the taxpayer's innate abilities (or "endowment"),
not just the taxpayer's actual resources. The impractical nature of
attempting to collect a tax based on a taxpayer's innate abilities,
however, has precluded most policymakers from seriously considering
such a tax base. Instead, the focus has been on whether a taxpayer's
ability to pay is better captured by the taxpayer's income or
consumption.
Although higher-income taxpayers are expected to pay more
taxes than low-income taxpayers, the ability-to-pay doctrine does not
resolve the debate about rate structure. The ability-to-pay approach
raises additional issues about whether taxpayer liabilities should
involve equal sacrifices and the appropriate level of such sacrifices.37 A
tax that imposes equal burdens on all taxpayers may have regressive,
proportional, or progressive rates, depending on whether the elasticity
of the marginal utility of income with respect to income is,
respectively, less than, equal to, or greater than one. 38 In other words,
not only does the marginal utility of income have to decline as income
increases, but it also has to decline at a rate that is greater than the
rate at which the taxpayer's income increases to justify a progressive
rate schedule. Because it is likely that elasticities of the marginal
utility of income differ among individuals, any attempt to design a tax
system based on equal burdens is bound to be controversial.
35. See, e.g., MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 18, at 242 (defining the ability-to-pay
principle). For an excellent discussion of the history of the ability-to-pay principle, see Stephen
Utz, Ability To Pay, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 867, 870 (2002).
36. See DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 150 (1986) ("We are likely, for
example, to feel that well-to-do people should pay more in taxes than poor people both because it
accords with our sense of justice and because we believe that well-to-do people typically derive
more benefit than poor people do from services such as national defense.").
37. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 18, at 455-65 (describing difficulties in designing a tax
system based on taxpayer sacrifice).
38.

MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 18, at 251.
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An alternative to imposing equal burdens is to impose
proportionate burdens. 39 Each taxpayer would give up an equal
portion of her income, measured in terms of the lost utility of the taxes
paid. The structure of the rates, however, is again dependent on the
rate of declining marginal utility. If a taxpayer's utility of income
remains constant, a flat tax rate will result in proportionate
burdens. 40 If marginal utility declines in a straight line, a progressive
tax rate will impose proportional burdens. 41 If, however, the marginal
utility decreases in a nonlinear fashion, then determining the
42
appropriate rate structure is difficult.
Like the benefit approach, the ability-to-pay principle does not
recommend one tax base over another. Some argue that the ability-topay principle favors an income tax because a consumption tax does not
tax income from capital and, therefore, does not fully reflect the
taxpayer's ability to pay. 43 Others counter that a consumption tax
burdens capital because the present value of capital is diminished by
the consumption tax that will be imposed when the taxpayer's capital
ultimately is consumed. 44 Moreover, advocates of a consumption tax
argue that a certain type of consumption tax, a progressive post-paid
consumption tax, is fairer than an income tax because it taxes the
yield on savings only when such yield is used to elevate a taxpayer's
45
standard of living.
The result is that, although the benefits and ability-to-pay
doctrines provide rationales for imposing a tax and determining
whether that rationale is fair, neither gives helpful guidance for
designing a tax system. This may explain why the debate about the
best design of a tax system has endured. Policymakers need to look
elsewhere for rationales for selecting a tax base and rates.
39. See, e.g., MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 20, at 29; Blum & Kalven, supra note 18, at 457
(analyzing the imposition of equal burdens and proportionate burdens).
40. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supranote 18, at 252.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43.

See RICHARD GOODE, THE INDMDUAL INCOME TAX 23-24 (rev. ed. 1975) (arguing that

income tax is preferable because it better captures the benefit from wealth that is not consumed
than a consumption tax does); Alfred G. Buehler, Ability to Pay, 1 TAX L. REV. 243, 250 (1946)
(arguing that an income tax is fairer than a consumption tax because the consumption tax
ignores capital and, therefore, does not fully reflect the taxpayer's ability to pay).
44. Daniel N. Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax with a Progressive Consumption Tax, 103
TAX NOTES 91, 106 (2004).
45. See McCaffery, supra note 12, at 923 ("A consistent progressive postpaid consumption
tax, in contrast, makes its decisions about the appropriate degree of progressivity at the rightfair-time. It falls on outflows, or spending. Such a tax favors (or does not disfavor) capital
smoothing transactions, but imposes a tax-in the form of the higher effective progressive
rates-on lifestyle enhancing or capital upward shifting transactions.").
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III. A DIFFERENT APPROACH
A. The Underlying Turtle is Opportunity
As discussed above, a major concern underlying the benefits
theory and ability-to-pay approach is the principle that a tax system
should be fair. Neither approach helps define a tax base because the
distributional concerns underlying the notions of fairness are ill
defined. While the benefits approach justifies a tax based on benefits
received by a taxpayer, it provides no guidance about how much tax
should be collected from each taxpayer and whether different rates
should be imposed. The ability-to-pay principle suffers from similar
difficulties-it does not provide a normative framework for how much
tax to collect or what rate structure to use. Both doctrines require
consideration of another principle-the imposition of equal burdensbut that principle is not helpful because of the uncertainty
surrounding the elasticities of the marginal utility of income.
Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel argue that identifying a just
tax requires looking outside the tax system and focusing on the
"broader principles of justice in government." 46 They reason that the
starting point of a tax, such as each taxpayer's income in an income
tax, is itself the product of government policies. Analyzing an income
tax based solely on the amount of taxes assessed ignores an important
factor-the fairness of the incomes earned by the taxpayers.
Professors Murphy and Nagel view the tax system as an instrument
that helps achieve governmental objectives for justice. They assess the
current state of tax policy analysis as woefully inadequate, stating:
[The] entire [current] approach is flawed in its foundations. If the distribution produced
by the market is not presumptively just, then the correct criteria of distributive justice
will make no reference whatever to that distribution, even as a baseline. Distributive
justice is not a matter of applying some equitable-seeming function to a morally
arbitrary initial distribution of welfare. Despite what many people implicitly assume,
the justice of a tax scheme cannot simply be evaluated by checking that average tax
rates increase fast enough with income .... [O]nce we reject the assumption that the
distribution of welfare produced by the market is just, we can no longer offer principles
47
of tax fairness apart from broader principles of justice in government.

46.

MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 20, at 30.

47. Id. For an earlier argument that tax analysis needs to take into account the conditions
that gave rise to the distribution of the tax base, see PATRICIA APPs, A THEORY OF INEQUALITY
AND TAXATION 4 (1981) c'max theory remains firmly grounded upon an innate or inherited
endowments theory of inequality. The aim of the analysis here is to examine tax incidence and
tax distortions taking account of the way in which institutional inequality is initiated and
perpetuated."). Many others also have noted that economic well being is the result of many
factors, including the individual's initial starting point, the efforts of others, and merit. See, e.g.,
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At first, it may seem that this approach increases the
complexity of the problem. If it is difficult to identify objectives in
taxation, will it not be exponentially more difficult to identify the
broader principles of justice in government? A broad consensus exists,
however, about the appropriate objectives for distributive justice in a
capitalist democracy. Many have proposed that the principle
underlying distributive justice for democratic governments is that "no
one should have less valuable resources and opportunities available to
him than anyone else, simply in virtue of some chance occurrence[,]
the risk of which he did not choose to incur."48 Others similarly have
suggested that equality of "opportunities, not outcomes" should be the
major concern of distributive justice. 49 Rawls asserted that "each
citizen, regardless of class or origin, should have the same chance of
attaining a favored social position, given the same talents and
willingness to try."50 Rawls's first principle of justice, that individuals
enjoy equal rights to the most extensive liberty possible, 5 1 was aimed
at allowing individuals to maximize self-realization. 52 His second
principle of justice stated that social and economic inequalities should
be arranged such that offices and positions are open to everyone under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity.5 3 A Task Force of the
American Political Science Association summarizes the prevailing

view:

Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 275-79 (1983)
(questioning "those who simply assume that the market distributes rewards to people who
deserve them and denies rewards to people who do not"); Sagit Leviner, From Deontology to
PracticalApplication: The Vision of a Good Society and Tax System, 26 VA. TAX REV. 405, 415-18
(2006) ("[Dlifficulty with the view of the market as neutral or providing just rewards is that, in
the real world, people do not enter the market with equal resources including identical or
otherwise equivalent talents, skills, or backgrounds."); Amartya Sen, The Moral Standing of the
Market, in ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 1, 1-19 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1995).
48. ERIC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL JUSTICE 1 (1991); Kornhauser, supra note 20, at 1728 ("What
Americans do agree on... is that all people should have an equal chance to achieve their goals,
including the accumulation of wealth and income.").
49. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 24 (1999)
(proposing that equality of "opportunities, not outcomes" should be the major concern); Richard
J. Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL. STUD. 77 (1989) (same);
Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 284
(1981) (discussing equality in resources).
50. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 115 (1999); see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 73 (1971) (advocating equality of opportunity).
51. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 50, at 60.
52. See RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 50, at 115 (observing social conditions
should be "such that each citizen, regardless of class or origin, should have the same chance of
attaining a favored social position, given the same talents and willingness to try").
53. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 50, at 73.
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Americans support private property and free enterprise, and see much of the skewed
distribution of wealth and income as a legitimate result of differences in individual
talent and effort. But it is important to remember that Americans accept economic
inequalities only when they are sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to get
ahead-to make the best of life for the individual or his or her family. Government is
expected to help ensure5 equal
opportunity for all, not to tilt toward those who already
4
have wealth and power.

The broad consensus about equal opportunity for selfrealization has not helped to resolve the debate about tax systems.
Marjorie Kornhauser observes that although most Americans believe
in equal opportunity, they disagree "on the exact nature of the steps to
be taken. ' 55 Indeed, determining what equal opportunity for selfrealization means is difficult. While there may be broad agreement
that everyone should have an equal opportunity to "get ahead," this
can be accomplished in many different ways. For example, does equal
opportunity for self-realization require equal resources at birth or that
each person possess the minimal resources needed for health,
56
education, and housing?
This disagreement suggests the need for a different method of
analysis. A tax system cannot be evaluated merely for its contribution
to achieving the commonly accepted, but difficult to define, goal of
equal opportunity for self-realization. A tax system should be designed
to achieve equal opportunity for self-realization as one of its principal
goals. This new perspective of looking at equal opportunity for selfrealization as a design issue identifies another foundational principle:
the promotion of democracy. Both political philosophy and empirical
literature suggest that equal access to the electoral process and
participation in the community are prerequisites to equal opportunity
for self-realization, regardless of the form of equal opportunity for selfrealization.
Political philosophers long have understood that participation
in democracy and in the community is necessary for individuals to
achieve self-realization. Such participation allows all, including the
least advantaged, to participate in the discussion about what equal
opportunity for self-realization means and how to achieve it. Rawls
believed that democracy provided an avenue for self-realization. He
stated, "It is only in active cooperation with others that one's powers

54. TASK FORCE OF THE AM. POLITICAL Sci. ASS'N ON INEQUALITY AND AM. DEMOCRACY,
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN AN AGE OF RISING INEQUALITY 4 (2004).
55. Kornhauser, supra note 20, at 1728.
56. For a discussion of different types of opportunity, see Anne L. Alstott, Equal
Opportunityand Inheritance Taxation, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 476-85 (2007).
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reach fruition. Only in social union is the individual complete." 57
Similarly, the philosopher John Dewey believed that democracy
should encourage communication among various groups because a
pluralistic conversation about differences is the best means to selfrealization. 58 Dewey hoped that participation by all would lead to the
identification of common interests, not merely bargaining over
individual interests, 59 and that better communication would lead to
understanding and to a better society. 60 He said, "Popular government
61
is educative. It forces a recognition that there are common interests."
He concluded that "the very heart of political democracy is
62
adjudication of social differences by an exchange of views."
These philosophers worried, however, that economic elites
could hijack the political process. Dewey said that access to
participation is to be free and equal "without respect to race, sex, class
or economic status."63 In reviewing Dewey's political philosophy,
William Caspary observes, "One of the chief obstacles to participation
and reasonable discussion, in Dewey's view, is the social class
structure which enables economic elites to dominate politics." 64 Rawls
also worried about the impact that inequalities would have on
"securing the fairness of elections and of political opportunities to run
for office." 65 He viewed fairness in the political process as important to
an ordered society. 66 Robert A. Dahl expresses a similar concern:
Extreme inequalities in the distribution of such key values as income, wealth, status,
knowledge, and military prowess are equivalent to extreme inequalities in political
resources. Obviously a country with extreme inequalities in political resources stands a

57. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 50, at 525 n.4; see WILLIAM R. CASPARY,
DEWEY ON DEMOCRACY 12 (2000).
58.

See JOHN DEWEY, 9 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY 107 (Jo Ann Boydston ed.

1969-1991) (discussing human interaction in a democratic society); Jim Garrison, John Dewey,
ENCYCLOPAEDIA

OF PHILOSOPHY

AND

john-dewey.htm (last visited Mar.
communication in democracies).

EDUCATION,

15,

2008)

http://www.vusst.hr/ENCYCLOPAEDIA/

(describing the

role and importance

of

59.

JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 207 (1927); see CASPARY, supra note 57, at

60.

DEWEY, supra note 59, at 207; see CASPARY, supra note 57, at 9.

61.

DEWEY, supra note 59, at 207; see CASPARY, supra note 57, at 9.

62.

DEWEY, 15 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY, supra note 58, at 273; see

9.

CASPARY, supra note 57, at 9.
63.

JOHN DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY 186 (2d ed. 1948); see CASPARY, supra

note 57, at 8.
64. CASPARY, supra note 57, at 12.
65.

RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 50, at 114-15.

66.

Id.
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very high chance of
having extreme inequalities in the exercise of power, and hence a
67
hegemonic regime.

Adopting tax policies that strengthen democracy, i.e., give all
participants an equal voice, 68 would improve opportunities for all
citizens to maximize self-realization because it allows all, including
the least advantaged, to participate in the discussion about what
equal opportunity for self-realization means and how to achieve it.
Empirical studies generally confirm the view of political philosophers
that increased participation of non-elites in the political process
results in governmental policies that improve opportunities for all
citizens. Studies have found that the existence of an inclusive political
system that considers the interests of all major groups in the
decisionmaking process results in a high level of equality. 69 Studies
also suggest that greater competitiveness in the election process
increases the level of government expenditures. 70 Several explanations

67. ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 82 (1971).
68. For articles asserting that an objective of democracy is to give all participants an equal
vote, see, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Equal DollarsPer Voter: A ConstitutionalPrincipleof Campaign
Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1225-26 (1994); David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and
CampaignFinance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1382 (1994).
69. J. Corina M. van Arnhem & Geurt J. Schotsman, Do PartiesAffect the Distributionof
Income? The Case of Advanced CapitalistDemocracies, in THE IMPACT OF PARTIES: POLITICS AND
POLICIES IN DEMOCRATIC CAPITALIST STATES 283, 342, 350-51 (Francis G. Castles ed., 1982).
This study found that countries in which corporatist processes exist are characterized by medium
to highly egalitarian redistributive systems. Id. at 350. Corporatism is defined as a situation
where "political elites generally accept the basic interests of the major groups in society" and
"carefully work together in order not to exclude major groups from decision-making processes."
Id. at 342; see also Vicki Birchfield & Markus M.L. Crepaz, The Impact of Constitutional
Structures and Collective and Competitive Veto Points on Income Inequality in Industrialized
Democracies, 34 EUR. J. POL. RES. 175, 193 (1998) ("Welfarist policies, which tend to reduce
income inequalities, will increase if political institutions allow access of groups which are below
the median income level.").
70. Charles F. Cnuddle & Donald J. McCrone, Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the
American States, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 858, 865 (1969); Michael Comiskey, Electoral
Competition and the Growth of Public Spending in 13 IndustrialDemocracies, 1950 to 1983, 26
COMP. POL. STUD. 350, 367 (1993); Richard E. Dawson & James E. Robinson, Inter-Party
Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States, 25 J. POL. 265, 282 (1963). See
generally Thomas M. Holbrook & Emily Van Dunk, Electoral Competition in the American States,
87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 955, 955 (1993) ("While the empirical evidence is somewhat mixed, most
studies indicate that competitive political systems do produce more liberal policy outcomes,
though the effects are sometimes small when compared to socioeconomic variables." (citations
omitted)); see also Charles Barrilleaux, A Test of the Independent Influences of Electoral
Competition and Party Strength in a Model of State Policy-Making, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1462,
1464-65 (1997) (finding that state policy liberalism increases with increased electoral
competition); Robert D. Plotnick & Richard F. Winters, Party, Political Liberalism, and
Redistribution: An Application to the American States, 18 AM. POL. Q. 430, 440-41, 452 (1990)
(finding evidence in a study of fifty states that electoral competition increases the proclivity of
state governments to adopt redistributive policies). Other studies have shown that the view of
the controlling party (liberal or conservative) also affects the distributive policies of the
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account for this model. 71 One is that, in competitive elections,
candidates cater to the median voter. 72 Because the median voter is
less wealthy than the average voter in a society that has skewed
income distribution, the median voter favors increased expenditures
for redistributive policies. 73 Alternatively, increased competition may
result in a higher turnout by lower socioeconomic groups, which may
74
result in greater deference by elected officials to those groups.
Such redistributive policies improve opportunities for selfrealization in a number of ways. The tax system reduces the burden
on the less advantaged by collecting more tax from higher-income
individuals. 75 Transfer payments, which pay revenues collected from

government which that party controls. See, e.g., Charles Barrilleaux, Thomas Holbrook & Laura
Langer, Electoral Competition, Legislative Balance and American State Welfare Policy, 46 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 415, 424 (2002); Alexander Hicks & Duane Swank, On the PoliticalEconomy of Welfare
Expansion:A ComparativeAnalysis of 18 Advanced CapitalistDemocracies, 1960-1971, 17 COMP.
POL. STUD. 81, 102-04 (1984).
71. See Sultan Ahmed & Kenneth V. Greene, Is the Median Voter a Clear-Cut Winner?:
Comparing the Median Voter Theory and Competing Theories in Explaining Local Government
Spending, 105 PUB. CHOICE 207, 207-25 (2000) (describing and testing various theories).
72. See, e.g., Randall G. Holcombe, The Median Voter Model in Public Choice Theory, 61
PUB. CHOICE 115, 115, 120-21 (1989) (noting that most of the empirical evidence is consistent
with the view that "the demand for public sector output in a democracy is the median voter's
demand"); Alan H. Meltzer & Scott F. Richard, Why Government Grows (and Grows) in a
Democracy, 52 PUB. INT. 111, 116-17 (1978) (discussing the correlation of median voter desires
with actual expenditures). The median voter theory has been challenged in a number of articles.
Some have argued that increased competition will cause parties to seek to mobilize their core
constituencies rather than to appeal to the median voter in order to win an election. See, e.g.,
Girish Gulati, Revisiting the Link Between Electoral Competition and Policy Extremism in the
U.S. Congress, 32 AM. POL. RES. 495, 510 (2004). Others have criticized the empirical studies of
the median voter theory for failure to link actual government expenditures to those predicted by
the model. See, e.g., Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, The Elusive Median Voter, 12 J. PUB.
ECON. 143, 144 (1979).
73. Holcombe, supra note 72, at 115, 120-21; Meltzer & Richard, supra note 72, at 116-17.
74. Holbrook & Van Dunk, supra note 70, at 955; Tom W. Rice, An Examination of the
Median Voter Hypothesis, 38 W. POL. Q. 211, 218, 221 (1985) (noting that increased voter turnout
resulted in redistributive policies); Evan J. Ringquist et al., Lower Class Mobilization and Policy
Linkage in the U.S. States: A Correction, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 339, 340 (1997) (noting that lower
class mobilization is associated with more liberal welfare policies). But see Elisabeth R. Gerber &
Arthur Lupia, Campaign Competition and Policy Responsiveness in Direct Legislation Elections,
17 POL. BEHAV. 287, 288 (1995) (noting that competition results in greater responsiveness only if
opponents have interests similar to the voting majority).
75. See Michael Strudler, Tom Petska & Ryan Petska, FurtherAnalysis of the Distribution
of Income and Taxes, 1979-2002, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Nov. 2004, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/O4asastr.pdf (examining the redistributive effects of federal income
tax rates); Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Inequality, Populism, and Democratic Tax
Policy, 114 TAX NOTES 16, 17-18 (2007) (discussing impact of income taxation on distribution and
inequality); Van Arnhem & Schotsman, supra note 69, at 292 (explaining how redistributive
policies help equalize distribution of income).
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high-income taxpayers to low-income individuals, increase resources. 76
Similarly, funding programs, such as public education, help the poor
to compete more effectively in the market.7 7 The positive effect of
democratic participation on self-realization is not a one way street.
Increased opportunity for self-realization also enhances citizen
involvement in politics and community. This is illustrated by the U.S.
experience with the G.I. Bill, a program that enabled 2,200,000 World
War II veterans to attend college and 5,600,000 to attend vocational
training. 78 Suzanne Mettler found that veterans who used the G.I.
Bill's education benefits joined more civic organizations and
79
participated in more political activities than veterans who did not.
beneficiaries'
that the program "enhanced
She concluded
socioeconomic circumstances and skills in ways that heightened their
capacity and predisposition for civic involvement."8 0
B. Efficiency Gains of Equal Opportunity
Section III.A argued that a just tax system should be designed
to facilitate equal participation in the political process in order to
create equal opportunity for self-realization. A utilitarian argument
also supports such a system. Tax policy analysts have ignored
potential benefits arising from equal opportunity for self-realization
and participation in the political process, perhaps due to perceived
difficulty in measuring such benefits.8 1 However, a surprising amount
of empirical literature suggests that these benefits may be
measurable. Equal opportunities for self-realization and for
participation in the political process create a sense of unity, not by
76. See Nathan Kelly, Political Choice, Public Policy, and DistributionalOutcomes, 49 AM.
J. OF POL. SCI. 865, 877 (2005) (discussing the effect of transfer programs on inequality); Van
Arnhem & Schotsman, supra note 69, at 292 (assessing the equalizing impact of transfer
payments).
77. Kelly, supra note 76, at 877. Kelly's findings suggest that the funding of programs, such
as education, have a greater impact on inequality than direct transfer payments. Id. The efficacy
of the expenditures will depend on the nature of the program and its management and staffing.
See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STRENGTHENING HEAD START: WHAT THE

EVIDENCE SHOWS, at Part III (June 2003), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/
StrengthenHeadStart03/index.htm (discussing the importance of coordination and the effects of
fragmentation on education at the state level).
78. Suzanne Mettler, Bringing the State Back in to Civic Engagement: Policy Feedback
Effects of the GI. Bill for World War II Veterans, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 351, 351 (2002).
79. Id. at 356-58.
80. Id. at 362.
81. See CASS SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 70-107 (1997) (observing that,
since human goods cannot be measured using a common index, social decisions cannot be based
solely on quantitative factors); Dodge, supra note 5, at 410 n.40 (stating that attempts to
compare efficiency to equity are the same as attempts to compare apples to oranges).
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making us all alike, but by uniting us in a common goal of
establishing conditions that allow all to achieve self-realization. A
developing literature in psychology suggests that the ability to
participate in the political process increases participants' sense of
well-being.8 2 This literature also suggests that a shared purpose and
83
sense of belonging to a common enterprise motivates people to excel.
In addition, a shared sense of purpose may help to lubricate the
wheels of commerce by reducing monitoring costs that parties might
incur otherwise. Robert Putnam observes:
A society characterized by generalized reciprocity is more efficient than a distrustful
society, for the same reason that money is more efficient than barter. If we don't have to
balance every exchange instantly, we can get a lot more accomplished. 84

Equality of opportunity also may translate into productivity
gains. Empirical studies suggest that equality in wealth distribution
correlates with increased productivity growth in the long run. As
shown in Table 1, most published studies have found a statistically
significant relationship between high concentrations of wealth at the
start of a period and poor economic growth in the subsequent twenty85
five or more years.

82. BRUNO S. FREY & ALOIS STUTZER, HAPPINESS AND ECONOMICS 143 (2002).
83. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE 349 (2000).
84. Id. at 21.
85. Alberto Alesina & Dani Rodrik, Distributive Politics and Economic Growth, 109 Q.J.
ECON. 465, 481 (1994); Alberto Alesina & Dani Rodrik, Distribution, Political Conflict and
Economic Growth, in POLITICAL ECONOMY AND BUSINESS CYCLES 22, 34 (Alex Cuckierman, Zvi
Hercowitz & Leonardo Leiderman eds., 1992); Francois Bourguignon, Growth, Distribution,and
Human Resources, in EN ROUTE TO MODERN GROWTH: LATIN AMERICA IN THE 1990s 43, 58
(Gustav Ranis ed., 1994); Klaus Deininger & Lyn Squire, New Ways of Looking at Old Issues:
Inequality and Growth, 57 J. DEV. ECON. 259, 268-69 (1998); Roberto Perotti, Growth, Income
Distribution,and Democracy: What the Data Say, 1 J. ECON. GROWTH 149, 159 (1996); Torsten
Persson & Guido Tabellini, Growth, Distributionand Politics, in POLITICAL ECONOMY, GROWTH,
AND BUSINESS CYCLES 3, 11-14 (Alex Cuckierman, Zvi Hercowitz & Leonardo Leiderman eds.,
1992); Hannu Tanninen, Income Inequality, Government Expenditures and Growth, 31 APPLIED
ECON. 1109, 1112 (1999); see Sugata Ghosh & Sarmistha Pal, The Effect of Inequality on Growth:
Theory and Evidence from the Indian States, 8 REV. DEV. ECON. 164, 175 (2004) (finding that
inequality in rural states adversely affected subsequent productivity growth, but that inequality
in urban states had no effect); Stephen Knowles, Inequality and Economic Growth: The
Empirical Relationship Reconsidered in the Light of Comparable Data, 41 J. DEV. STUD. 135,
151-52 (2005) (finding that inequality, measured using expenditures by individuals, adversely
affects economic growth in sample consisting primarily of less developed countries).
In contrast, the results of studies that have used shorter time periods are mixed. For a
survey of the studies, see James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes and Wealth, 76 NYU L. REV. 825,
831-35 (2001) and Huw Lloyd-Ellis, On the Impact of Inequality on Productivity Growth in the
Short and Long Term: A Synthesis, 29 CANADIAN PUB. POLY S65, 866 (2003). As discussed in
Repetti, supra, at 836, and Lloyd-Ellis, supra, at 877, it is likely that the long-term studies
reflect a more accurate picture because the factors that hurt productivity growth are most likely
to manifest themselves over a long period of time. See infra text accompanying notes 88-90.
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TABLE 1
Author

Time
Period

Data

Negative Correlation
Between Initial
Inequality and

Ghosh & Pal (2002)

35 years

States in India

X*

Tanninen (1999)

32 years

52 countries

X

Deininger & Squire (1998)
Knowles (2005)

32 years
30 years

61 countries
35 countries

X
X**

Alesina & Rodrik (1992)

25 years

X

Persson & Tabellini (1992)

25 years

24 democratic
countries
80 countries

Alesina & Rodrik (1994)

25 years

46 countries

X

Perotti (1996)

25 years

X

Bourguignon (1999)

25 years

36 countries
35 countries

Subsequent Growth

X

X

* Ghosh and Pal found a negative relationship between initial inequality and
subsequent growth in rural states, but found that inequality in urban states had no
effect.
**

Sample consisted primarily of less developed countries.

These long-term studies challenge the conventional wisdom
that "inequality is good for incentives and, therefore, good for
growth. '8 6 The conventional wisdom is that inequality should increase
growth because (1) the wealthy had a higher marginal propensity to
save than the poor; (2) only the wealthy could make the large capital
commitment necessary for industrial growth; and (3) the poor would
be motivated to work harder.8 7 However, the long-term studies
86.

Philippe Aghion, Eve Caroli & Cecilia Garcia Pefialosa, Inequality and Economic

Growth: The Perspectiveof the New Growth Theories, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1615, 1615 (1999).

87. Id. at 1620. The findings also challenge Simon Kuznets's theory about the role of
inequality. Kuznets theorized that as a society develops from a rural to an industrial economy,
inequality initially should increase due to the higher income earned by the industrial workers
compared to rural workers. Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, 45 AM.
ECON. REV. 1, 1-28 (1955); Simon Kuznets, Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of
Nations, 11 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 1, 67-69 (1963). Inequality should decrease

subsequently, however, as more rural workers transition into industrial jobs. The findings
described above that link inequality to slow growth, therefore, may merely reflect countries
transitioning from a rural to industrial economy. The difficulty with this explanation, however, is
that inequality has increased in the industrial countries, contrary to the Kuznets hypothesis.
See, e.g., Josef Zweimuller, Inequality, Redistribution, and Economic Growth 3-5, (Institute for
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suggest that other more powerful forces may be involved. The
explanations with the most support-the failure of countries with
inequality to invest adequately in education8 8 and the presence of
social unrest in those countries 8 9 -are also the explanations most
likely to manifest themselves over a long period of time. 90
Furthermore, inequality appears to impose economic costs
because of its effect on health. Commentators on public health have
noted that mortality rates are strongly related to the degree of
inequality in a population. 91 Studies suggest that a person's relative
income and status in a society are more important for a person's
health than her absolute standard of living. 92 One explanation for this
is that income inequality results in increased levels of frustration,
which may cause harmful behavior. 93 Another explanation is that
societies with large disparities in income may underinvest in
education, health care, and other factors that increase health. 94 Some
also have argued that large disparities in income lead to declining
social cohesion, as exhibited in civic participation, norms of
reciprocity, and trust in others. 95 Regardless of the explanation, it
seems clear that striving to achieve equality has tangible benefits.
Studies also suggest that increased participation in democracy
affects productivity, although the results are controversial because of
disputes about appropriate methodology. It is clear that democracies

Empirical Research In Economics, University of Zurich, Working Paper No. 31, 2000) (noting
increased wealth concentration in industrialized countries); see also Deininger & Squire, supra
note 85, at 278 (finding no support for Kuznets hypothesis). Thus, many question the validity of
the Kuznet's hypothesis. See, e.g., Deininger & Squire, supra note 85; Zweimuller, supra.
88. Oded Galor & Joseph Zeira, Income Distributionand Macroeconomics, 60 REV. ECON.
STUD. 35, 35-51 (1993); Perotti, supra note 85, at 152-53; Kevin Sylwester, Income Inequality,
EducationExpenditures and Growth, 63 J. DEV. ECON. 379, 388 (2000).
89. Perotti, supra note 85, at 173-75 (finding that social and political instability decrease
economic growth); Carolyn B. Rodriguez, An Empirical Test of the Institutionalist View on
Income Inequality: Economic Growth within the United States, 59 AM. J. ECON. & SOCIOLOGY
303, 310-11 (2000) (asserting that inequality results in higher incidence of property and violent
crimes).
90. Repetti, supra note 85, at 836; see also Lloyd-Ellis, supra note 85, at S77 (arguing that
the impact of inequality on poor economic growth is likely to grow stronger in the long-term
because of the delayed impact of inadequate education).
91. See, e.g., Ichiro Kawachi et al., Social Capital,Income Inequality and Mortality, 87 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 1491, 1491 (1997) (discussing the strong relationship between a society's income
inequality and its level of mortality); Richard G. Wilkinson, Comment: Income, Inequality, and
Social Cohesion, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1504, 1504-05 (1997) (noting that more egalitarian
countries and states have lower mortality rates).
92. Wilkinson, supra note 91, at 1505.
93. Kawachi et al., supra note 91, at 1491.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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generally have higher productivity than non-democracies. 96 Studies
that have attempted to analyze the impact of the degree of democracy
on economic growth, however, have been contradictory. One study that
reviewed twenty-one empirical analyses of the relationship between
the degree of democracy and economic growth observed that eight of
the studies found that strong democracy encouraged growth, eight
found the opposite, and five found no effect. 97 Several of the
contradictory studies have been criticized for their choice of
parameters and methodology. 98 David LeBlang conducted a study in
which he corrected for these problems and found that the greater the
extent of democracy at the beginning of a period, the greater the
economic growth during that period. 99
96. See Pablo M. Pinto & Jeffrey F. Timmons, The Political Determinants of Economic
Performance:Political Competitionand the Sources of Growth, 38 COMP. POL. STUD. 26, 30 (2005)
(noting that, on average, democracies tend to have better economic growth than nondemocracies).
97. Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, PoliticalRegimes and Economic Growth, 7 J.
ECON. PERSP. 51, 60 (1993). Another study, by Robert Barro, found the "suggestion" of a ushaped relationship between democracy and economic growth. Robert J. Barro, Democracy and
Growth 37-38 (NBER, Working Paper No. 4909, 1994), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w4909. He observed that, as countries moved from a weak to a stronger democracy,
economic growth increased, but that once a moderate level of democracy was achieved, growth
decreased. Id. Barro cautions that these results are unreliable, however. He states, "One cannot
conclude from this evidence that more or less democracy is a critical element of economic
growth." Id. at 38.
98. David Leblang, Political Democracy and Economic Growth: Pooled Cross-Sectional and
Time Series Evidence, 27 BRIT. J. POL. Sdi. 453, 455 (1997). Most studies have used the average
growth rates of several countries for the period being studied, usually 1960-1985. This has been
challenged because the growth rates for shorter time spans within the 1960-1985 period vary
significantly. Id. Using the average for the entire period masks changes occurring within the
shorter periods. In addition, many of the studies may have a reverse causality problem because
it is not clear whether equality is encouraging growth or vice versa.. Id. To avoid this, only the
state or condition of democracy at the start of the period should be used. Id. at 457; see also J.
Helliwell, Empirical Linkages Between Democracy and Economic Growth, 24 BRIT. J. POL. SCI.
225, 225-48 (1994) (evaluating the two-way linkages between democracy and economic growth).
99. Leblang, supranote 98, at 460. Leblang corrected the masking problem, described supra
note 98, by using the average growth rate for ten-year periods within the period 1960-1989 for
seventy countries. In addition, he corrected the causality problem, described supra note 98, by
using the state of democracy in each country at the start of each ten year period. Id. at 453-57,
460. As discussed in the text, correcting these problems yielded statistically significant results
that the greater democracy was at the beginning of the period, the greater economic growth
would be during the period.
Another explanation for some of the contradictory results may be that, as countries become
more democratic, investments in the countries shift, resulting in conflicting effects on
productivity. Theorists have proposed that increased political competition (i.e., open and
inclusive elections) may hurt productivity because it discourages investment in physical capital
due to increased distributive policies. Pinto & Timmons, supra note 96, at 34. At the same time,
however, there are countervailing positive forces that may improve productivity. Increased
political competition encourages more investment in education, which enhances productivity. Id.;
Leblang, supra note 98, at 460; William T. Dickens, Isabell Sawhill & Jeffrey Tibbs, The Effects
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Thus, persuasive evidence suggests that equality of
opportunities for self-realization and participation in democracy may
provide economic gains. Achieving distributive justice has positive
efficiency benefits that analysts previously have ignored and that
should be considered in the debate about the design of a tax system.
TV. DESIGN OF THE TAX SYSTEM FOR EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY FOR
SELF-REALIZATION AND PARTICIPATION IN DEMOCRACY

A. Introduction
Designing a tax system to promote democracy and equal
opportunity for self-realization eliminates the uncertainties of relying
on changes in marginal utility to determine the appropriate levels of
tax and the rate structure. This design process also suggests an
appropriate tax base. This Part begins by reviewing the basic design
issues for a tax and the contributions made by the democracy and
equal opportunity for self-realization doctrines to resolving these
issues. Because equal opportunity for self-realization is dependent on
attaining an open democracy, it is not surprising that the democracy
doctrine provides the most detail about tax system design.100
of Investing in Early Education on Economic Growth 5-7 (Brookings Inst. Policy Brief No. 153,
Apr. 2006); Lawrence J. Schweinhart et al., Lifetime Effects: The High/Scope Perry Preschool
Study Through Age 40, at 73 (Monographs of the High/Scope Educ. Research Found. No. 14,
2005). Moreover, in politically competitive democracies, new knowledge filters quickly through
the political and economic system because the society is open, thereby increasing productivity.
Pinto & Timmons, supra note 96, at 34. Also, democratic countries are likely to enforce antitrust
prohibitions strictly. Id. The net effect of these conflicting forces will vary depending on their
relative strengths. In analyzing data for ninety-one countries, Pinto and Timmons found that
increased political competition correlates with decreased investment in capital but increased
investment in education. Id. at 45-46. They also found an increased return on capital investment,
suggesting that more democratic nations obtain more growth per unit of capital invested. Id.
100. Many academics, including the author, have written about the need to take into account
the impact of a tax system on democracy. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Report of the
President'sAdvisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform: A Critical Assessment and a Proposal, 59
SMU L. REV. 551, 556 (2006) (arguing that an income tax is necessary to prevent the
accumulation of private power that is not accountable to the people); Marjorie E. Kornhauser,
The Rhetoric of the Anti-ProgressiveIncome Tax: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465,
521 (1987) (stating that a progressive income tax contributes to stability of the U.S. government
by reducing the gap between the wealthy and the poor); Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G.
Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the Casefor Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 68
(1998) (suggesting that a progressive tax helps preserve democracy by reducing inequality);
Repetti, supra note 85, at 825 (arguing that an estate tax is necessary to prevent accumulations
of wealth that otherwise would impede democracy). This Article advances our understanding by
suggesting that, instead of merely recognizing the effect of a tax on democracy, the achievement
of equal participation in democracy and equal opportunity for self-realization should be the
principal components of tax equity that guide the design of a tax system. As discussed in Part IV,
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Basic design issues for a tax include determining the
appropriate amount of revenue to collect and identifying the proper
tax base, rate structure, and time for assessing the tax. Both the equal
opportunity for self-realization doctrine and the democracy doctrine
recommend an amount of revenue to collect because both require a
certain level of government expenditures to achieve equal economic
and political opportunity. For example, funding of education, health
care, and housing programs is necessary to establish minimal
conditions to achieve equal opportunity for self-realization and to
equip persons to engage in democracy.
Regarding rate structure, the opportunity for self-realization
doctrine suggests that tax burdens should impair as little as possible
the ability of each individual to have the same chance to succeed.
Consequently, regressive rates are inappropriate because they impede
opportunities for low-income individuals and counteract spending
programs intended to benefit these persons. 10 1 The choice between
proportional rates and progressive rates under the opportunity
doctrine is less clear, however, because the choice is an empirical
issue, not a normative question. The solution depends on the amount
of revenues needed. A proportionate tax is appropriate if adequate
revenue can be collected using a proportional rate without impairing
the ability of the least advantaged to achieve equal opportunity. If,
under a proportional tax, revenue needs require a rate that imposes
too great a burden on the least advantaged, a progressive rate should
be used. Resolution of this issue requires determination of the amount
of after-tax income each taxpayer needs for equality of opportunity
and the amount of revenues necessary to fund government.
The self-realization doctrine also does not recommend one tax
base over another. The key insight from the equality of opportunity for
self-realization doctrine-that a tax should not burden the less
advantaged to the extent that their ability to achieve self-realization
is impaired-could be accomplished with an income tax, a
consumption tax, or a wealth tax. Similarly, the equality of
opportunity for self-realization doctrine does not recommend the
timing of the tax. Minimizing the tax burden on the least advantaged

such recognition resolves many uncertainties about tax base, timing, and rate structure that
currently exist.
101. See generally Kornhauser, supra note 20, at 1730 ("If equality of opportunity is the
dominant meaning of equality, then a progressive tax system is the best structure to ensure this
equality."); McMahon, Jr. & Abreu, supra note 100, at 70 n.267 (1998) (arguing that support for a
progressive income tax can be found in its reduction of "disparities in after-tax income that
dampen opportunity," but noting that further discussion of the choice between an income tax and
consumption tax "must await another time").
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does not require assessment of the tax at a particular time so long as
the same amount of revenue is collected in present value terms.
B. Refinements to Tax Design under the Democracy Principle
The opportunity for self-realization doctrine supports a tax
structure that is not regressive. Questions remain, however, about
whether the rate structure should be progressive or proportional, and
about the appropriate tax base and time for assessing the tax. The
democracy doctrine fills these gaps and recommends a progressive
income tax that taxes investment income as it accrues. To explore the
normative case for a progressive income tax under the democracy
principle, and to determine the best tax base and time for assessing
the tax, the first part of this Section discusses the problems that
impede equal participation in the political process. It demonstrates
that wealthy individuals are able to influence disproportionately the
elective and legislative process as well as their communities. They
exert this influence through campaign contributions and investment of
their wealth. This influence hurts a democracy's goals of allowing selfrealization through the political process because it impedes equal
access and participation in the process. As discussed above, the
disruption of a democratic system also may harm economic activities.
If the objective underlying the structure of a tax system is to help
democracy, the tax should impose a burden on a taxpayer's ability to
exert disproportionate influence on the political process. Thus, the
equality of participation in democracy doctrine supports a progressive
income tax that burdens investment income.
1. The Impact of Income and Wealth on Democracy
In order to glean insight into the best design of a tax system,
this subsection examines the ways in which high-income individuals
can distort the political process. Case studies and empirical literature
have evaluated the impact of the wealthy on representative
government and the communities in which high-income individuals
live. They show that the wealthy exert a disproportionate influence on
government and their communities.
a. Impact on Representative Government
High-income individuals have a greater influence on elected
officials than middle- and low-income individuals. When Americans of
different income strata disagree about appropriate policies, Martin
Gilens has found that policy outcomes are consistent with the
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preferences of the most affluent and bear no relationship to the
preferences of the middle class and the poor. 10 2 In his conclusion, he
speculates about the cause:
If government policy is uniquely responsive to the preferences of affluent Americans, as
the evidence above suggests, by what mechanisms do the affluent exert their influence?
My data are not well suited to answering this question .... But the most obvious source
of influence over policy that distinguishes high-income Americans is10 money
and the
3
willingness to donate to parties, candidates and interest organizations.

In fact, a majority of the individuals contributing to political
candidates have high incomes. A study of congressional campaign
contributions made in 1997 found that 81% of the contributors of $200
or more to congressional candidates had annual family incomes of over
$100,000.104 Forty-six percent of the donors had annual family
incomes over $250,000, and 20% had incomes over $500,000.105
Campaign contributions influence election results. 10 6 Studies
have shown the major impact that campaign financing has on the
outcome of U.S. Senate elections, 10 7 gubernatorial contests, 0 8 and
state legislative elections. 10 9 For example, in elections for open Senate
seats, the financial resources and relative experience of the candidates
are the most important determinants of the outcome. 110 Moreover,
campaign expenditures of challengers are the most important factor
affecting the incumbent senator's reelection chances."' In state
legislature elections, candidate spending is the "overwhelming"

102. Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 PUB. OPINION Q. 778, 78889 (2005).
103. Id. at 793.
104. John Green et al., Individual Congressional Campaign Contributors: Wealthy,
Conservative and Reform-Minded, at tbl. 1 (June 9, 1998), http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/
donors/donors.htm.
105. Id.
106. ANTHONY GIERZYNSKI, MONEY RULES: FINANCING ELECTIONS IN AMERICA 60 (2000).
107. E.g., Alan I. Abramowitz, Explaining Senate Election Outcomes, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
385, 395-99 (1988); Charles Stewart III, A Sequential Model of U.S. Senate Elections, 14 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 567, 577-84 (1989).
108. E.g., Sarah M. Morehouse, Money Versus Party Effort: Nominatingfor Governor, 34 Am.
J. Pol. Sci. 706, 722-23 (1990); Samuel C. Patterson, Campaign Spending Contests for Governor,
35 W. POL. Q. 457, 475-76 (1982).
109. E.g. Gregory A. Caldeira & Samuel C. Patterson, Bringing Home the Votes: Electoral
Outcomes in State Legislative Races, 4 POL. BEHAV. 33, 33-38 (1982) (discussing elections in
California and Iowa); Anthony Gierzynski & David Breaux, Legislative Elections and the
Importance of Money, 21 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 337, 351-52 (1996) (analyzing twelve state legislative
elections); Michael W. Giles & Anita Pritchard, Campaign Expenditures and Legislative
Elections in Florida,10 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 71, 84-85 (1985) (examining Florida House elections).
110. Abramowitz, supra note 107, at 397.
111. Id.
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indicator of success where the primary elections are not preceded or
112
followed by a convention.
Contributors also seek to exploit their contributions. Janet M.
Box-Steffenmeier and J. Tobin Grant found that Political Action
Committees ("PACs") contribute to legislators who are successful in
113
getting a large percentage of their sponsored bills enacted into law.
Further, a study of the Tax Reform Act of 1986114 found that
concerned citizens significantly increased their contributions to
members of the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate
Finance Committee during the period preceding the Act's adoption.1 1 5
PACs time their contributions around key votes in order to buy access
1 16
to legislators and to encourage them to participate in the process.
This strategy appears to work; one study found a correlation between
PAC contributions to senators and their participation in floor votes on
roll call issues.1 17 It determined that voting participation increased as
the percentage of contributions senators received from PACs
increased. 1 8 Large contributors also have more access to elected
officials than other contributors do. 11 9 Laura Langbein found a strong
correlation between contributions and the amount of time that elected
officials spent with contributors.' 20 Similarly, others have suggested
that patterns of campaign contributions are consistent with the
121
pursuit of access.
Other evidence indicates that contributors influence how
elected officials vote. Although studies have found mixed results
regarding a direct relationship between contributions and the vote of
senators or members of the House in highly visible roll calls on the

112. Morehouse, supra note 108, at 722.
113. Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier & J. Tobin Grant, All in a Day's Work: The Financial
Rewards of Legislative Effectiveness, 24 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 511, 519 (1999).
114. I.R.C. § 1 et seq. (2006).
115. Jeffery Milyo, Electoral and Financial Effects of Changes in Committee Power: The
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Budget Reform, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and the Money
Committees in the House, 40 J.L. & ECON. 93, 97 (1997).
116. Thomas Stratmann, The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions
Everything?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 85, 109-10 (1998) (concluding that PACs time their contributions in
order to influence voting by legislators on important bills).
117. Peter T. Calcagno & John D. Jackson, PoliticalAction Committee Spending and Senate
Roll Calling Voting, 97 PUB. CHOICE 569, 582 (1998) (observing that participation in Senate
votes increases because of PAC contributions).
118. Id.
119. Laura I. Langbein, Money and Access: Some Empirical Evidence, 48 J. POL. 1052, 105761 (1986).
120. Id. at 1060-61.
121. E.g., J. David Gopoian, What Makes PACs Tick? An Analysis of the Allocation Patterns
of Economic Interest Groups, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 259, 262-63 (1984).
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floor, 122 studies show that contributions appear to influence roll call
votes on issues that do not attract significant publicity. 123 For
example, contributions appear to have influenced votes on trucking
legislation that received little publicity. 124 Similarly, contributions
seem to have influenced votes on the Bank Underwriting Bill, 125 which
126
received less publicity than other bills affecting the financial sector.
Studies of state proceedings have found direct evidence that campaign
127
contributions influence the voting records of state legislators.
In addition, contributions appear to motivate greater partisan
activity at the committee level. Richard Hall and Frank Wayman
examined the relationship between campaign contributions and the
activities of members of three House committees on three bills (the
Dairy Production Stabilization Act, 128 the Job Training Partnership
Act,' 29 and the Natural Gas Market Policy Act of 1984130).1 3 1 They
found that the greater the contributions, the greater the
representatives' level of committee activities consistent with the
interests of the contributors. 32 The activities included attendance,

122. See generally Janet Grenzke, Money and Congressional Behavior, in MONEY,
ELECTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY: REFORMING CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE 143, 144
(Margaret Latus Nugent & John R. Johannes eds., 1990) (surveying studies); Richard A. Smith,
Interest Group Influence in the U.S. Congress, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 89, 89 (1995) (same).
123. See Grenzke, supranote 122, at 150-51 (summarizing studies).
124. Woodrow Jones, Jr. & K. Robert Keiser, Issue Visibility and the Effects of PAC Money,
68 SOC. SCI. Q. 170, 170 (1987).
125. H.R. 4040, 97th Cong. (1981).
126. Jean Reith Schroedel, Campaign Contributionsand Legislative Outcomes, 39 W. POL. Q.
371, 373-74, 383 (1986).
127. E.g., Michael Evans Begay, Michael Traynor & Stanton A. Glantz, The Tobacco
Industry, State Politics, and Tobacco Education in California, 83 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1214,
1215-17 (1993) (examining tobacco industry's influence on the California legislature); Stanton A.
Glantz & Michael E. Begay, Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions are Affecting Tobacco
Control Policymaking in California, 272 JAMA 1176, 1181-82 (1994) (same); Fred Monardi &
Stanton A. Glantz, Are Tobacco Industry Campaign ContributionsInfluencing State Legislative
Behavior?, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 918, 920 (1998) (examining tobacco industry's influence on
state legislatures in six states). But see Jay K. Dow & James W. Endersby, Campaign
Contributions and Legislative Voting in the California Assembly, 22 AM. POL. Q. 334, 348-49
(1994) (finding no effect of contributions by business groups or labor unions on California
legislators).
128. Pub. L. No. 98-180, 97 Stat. 1128 (1983).
129. Pub. L. No. 96-300, 96 Stat. 1322 (1982).
130. H.R. 4277, 98th Cong. (1984).
131. Richard L. Hall & Frank W. Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the
Mobilizationof Bias in Congressional Committees, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 797, 797-99 (1990).
132. Id. at 809-10, 813-15; see also Diana Evans, Before the Roll Call: Interest Group
Lobbying and Public Outcomes in House Committees, 49 POL. RES. Q. 287, 287-88 (1996)
(examining the relationship between interest group contributions and congressional committee
activities).

1158
voting, speaking,
133
negotiations.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
offering

amendments,

and

[Vol. 61:4:1129
behind-the-scenes

b. Impact on Communities
In addition to its impact on the political process, wealth affects
life in the community. The placement of investments and ownership of
assets in a community can exert as much political influence as direct
campaign contributions. Michael Walzer succinctly describes this
phenomenon:
It would be a mistake to imagine, however, that money has political effects only when it
"talks" to candidates and officials .... It also has political effects closer to home, in the
market itself and in its firms and enterprises .... Even within the adversary relation of
owners and workers, with unions and grievance procedures in place, owners may still
exercise an illegitimate kind of power. They make all sorts of decisions that severely
constrain and shape the lives of their employees (and their fellow citizens, too). Might
not the enormous capital investment represented by plants, furnaces, machines, and
assembly lines be better regarded as a political than an economic good? To say this
doesn't mean that it can't be shared among individuals in a variety of ways, but only
that it shouldn't carry the conventional entailments of ownership. Beyond a certain
scale, the means of production are not properly called commodities...
for they generate
13 4
a kind of power that lifts them out of the economic sphere.

The famous case studies of Muncie, Indiana 35 in the books
Middletown 36 and Middletown in Transition137 illustrate Professor
Walzer's point that wealthy individuals exercise disproportionate
influence on their communities. 138 The accumulation of capital enables
wealthy individuals to influence community affairs in ways that the

133. Hall & Wayman, supra note 131, at 810-11.
134. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 122
(1982).

135. Though not identified at the time of publication, it was later revealed that Muncie,
Indiana was the setting for the Middletown studies. See, e.g., John Herbers, How They're Doing
in Muncie, Ind., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1982, § 7 (Book Review), at 11 (reviewing THEODORE
CAPLAW ET AL., MIDDLETOWN FAMILIES: FIFTY YEARS OF CHANGE AND CONTINUITY (1982)).
136. ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN MERRELL LYND, MIDDLETOWN: A STUDY IN AMERICAN
CULTURE (1929).
137. ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN MERRELL LYND, MIDDLETOWN IN TRANSITION: A STUDY IN
CULTURAL CONFLICTS (1937).

138. Others also have argued that wealthy individuals and corporations exert too much
influence over the media in their communities. See, e.g., BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA
MONOPOLY 5-6 (5th ed. 1977) (" 'Market dominant' corporations in the mass media have
dominant influence over the public's news, information, public ideas, popular culture, and
political attitudes."); MICHAEL PARENTI, INVENTING REALITY: THE POLITICS OF MASS MEDIA 33-37
(2d ed. 1993) (discussing the influence of corporate owners and advertisers over media content).
Hollywood has expressed this theme, as well. Frank Capra's classic movie It's a Wonderful Life
portrayed a wealthy miser inflicting misery on his community. ITS A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty
Films 1946); see William S. Blatt, Minority Discounts, Fair Market Value, and the Culture of
Estate Taxation, 52 TAX L. REV. 225, 250 (1997) (discussing the movie).
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less wealthy cannot. Middletown describes the effect that wealthy
business owners have on the media through their placement of
advertisements:
The growing profit in controlling the agencies of news diffusion has developed yet
another use of the press-that of buttressing the interests of the business class
advertisers who buy advertising; more than ever before it is the business class
advertisers who are the supporters of the newspapers, rather than the rank and file of
readers of the paper. It is largely taken for granted in Middletown that newspapers,
while giving information to the reading public as best they may, must not do it in any
way that will offend their chief supporters. Independence of editorial comment happens
to be in rough inverse ratio to the amount of advertising carried. The leading paper
rarely says anything editorially calculated to offend local business men; the weaker
paper "takes the stand" editorially from time to time on such matters as opposition to
child labor; while the third paper, the four-page weekly Democratic sheet, carries no
to a rival paper,
advertising except such political advertising as must legally be1 given
39
and habitually comments freely and vociferously on local affairs.

Middletown also notes that the affluent exerted control over
the news content of the local newspapers:
Not only advertising and editorial comment but the actual news presented is not
unaffected by Middletown's dominant interests. It is generally recognized in Middletown
that adverse news about prominent business class families is frequently treated
differently, even 1to4 0 the point of being suppressed entirely, than news about less
prominent people.

This control has been alleged in other contexts. The Dupont family
supposedly suppressed stories and editorials when they owned the
14 1
largest newspapers in Delaware.
Middletown in Transition discusses the political pressure the
affluent applied, not only through the press, but also through their
employees:
The... election witnessed perhaps the strongest effort in the city's history by the local
big businessmen (industrialists and bankers) to stampede local opinion in behalf of a
single presidential candidate. These men own Middletown's jobs and they largely own
Middletown's press; and they made use of both sources of pressure-though not to the
point of excluding summaries of President Roosevelt's speeches .... The pressure in the
factories is reported to have been heavy and direct .... 142

In summary, the evidence shows that the selection of
investments and deployment of assets allow the wealthy to exert a
disproportionate influence on governments and their communities.

139.
140.
141.
142.

LYND & LYND, supranote 136, at 475 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 476.
BAGDIKIAN, supra note 138, at 42.
LYND & LYND, supra note 137, at 360-61 (footnote omitted).

1160

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:4:1129

2. Using the Tax System to Burden Political Power
Section IV.B.1 demonstrates that economic power distorts the
political process in representative government and in the community
through campaign contributions and through the placement and
control of capital. Because the underlying goal of distributive justice in
a democracy is to establish conditions that will provide equal
opportunity for all to participate, the government's tax system should
be designed to impose a burden on the taxpayer's ability to exert
disproportionate influence on the political process.
The argument that a tax system should help to achieve equal
participation in the democratic process is certain to be controversial. A
tax system, by itself, will never achieve absolutely equal access to the
political process. Doing so would require confiscatory rates above a
certain level of income, which are likely to harm productivity and be
politically unacceptable. But the tax system can augment other
approaches to achieving equal access to the political process, such as
campaign finance reform.
Campaign finance laws standing alone cannot eliminate or
even significantly curb disproportionate political power, as money
always finds a way to circumvent political restrictions. The relative
ineffectiveness of campaign reform is illustrated by recent history.
Prior to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002,143 significant
limits on campaign contributions existed. These limits, however, were
easily circumvented. For example, individuals and the PACs that they
financed could spend unlimited amounts on their own advertisements
to support or defeat candidates and to advocate issues. 144 Also, Federal
Election Commission advisory opinions allowed political parties to
raise unlimited amounts of money from individuals, corporations, and
labor unions (so-called "soft money") that parties could use to fund
administrative expenses, voter registration and turnout programs,
and state party organizations.1 45 State organizations could use soft
money for general state election campaign purposes if the
contributions were legal under state law. 146 Large amounts of soft

143. Pub. L. No. 107-155 (2007).
144. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-51 (1976) (per curiam).
145. Op. FEC 1978-10 (Part A) (Aug. 29, 1978), reprinted in Campaign Practices Guide:
Federal Election Commission Advisory Opinions 1975-1984 (Cong. Q., ed. 1988); Op. FEC 197672, reprinted in Campaign Finance Reform: A Sourcebook 187-89 (Anthony Corrado et al.,
Brookings Inst. eds. 1997), available at http://www.brook.edu/gs/cf/sourcebk/chap6.pdf; see also
GIERZYNSKI, supra note 105, at 45 (noting effects of congressional amendments to Federal
Election Commission Act and FEC advisory opinions).
146. GIERZYNSKI, supra note 106, at 45.
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money were raised, and it had a significant effect. One authority
described the role of soft money in the 1996 elections:
In 1996 the Republican's national committees raised $141.2 million. The national
Democratic committees raised $122 million. They used the money to run "issue ads" that
benefited their presidential nominees; they distributed the rest to state party
organizations that registered voters, campaigned on behalf of the
parties' candidates
147
(both state and federal), and got voters to the polls on election day.

The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002148 made several
changes that were intended to halt the influence of soft money. It
banned national party committees from using soft money. 149 In
addition, it prohibited state and local parties from using soft money in
federal election activities. 150 The results of these reforms have been
mixed. The positive benefits are that soft money has all but
disappeared and the number of contributions by small donors has
surged. 151 But almost half of the soft money that disappeared has been
replaced by funding through section 527 organizations, a new method
invented by skillful advisors to circumvent the limits. In 2002,
national parties raised $591 million through these organizations. In
2004, they raised $271 million. 15 2 A section 527 organization is an
independent political organization that is not subject to campaign
contribution limitations. 153 Many of the staff members of the section
527 organizations were also staff members of the national parties.1 54
The amount that wealthy individuals contributed to section 527
organizations is impressive. Twenty-four donors accounted for $142
million of contributions to section 527 organizations.1 55 Among these
donors was George Soros, who contributed $24 million. 15 6 Soros was
147. Id.
148. Pub. L. No. 107-155 (2007).
149. 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
150. Id. § 441i(b). Another aspect of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, which prohibited
corporations from making any broadcast that referred to a candidate within a certain time period
of federal elections, was recently the subject of a Supreme Court ruling. FEC v. Wis. Right To
Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007). The Court ruled that the prohibition was unconstitutional as
applied to the advertisements at issue in that case, even though they referred to a candidate,
because the advertisements were not an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate. The
long-term implications of this decision are not clear.
151. Anthony Corrado, Party Finance in the Wake of BCRA An Overview, in THE ELECTION
AFTER REFORM: MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT 19, 26-28
(Michael J. Malbin ed., 2006).
152. Stephen R. Weissman & Ruth Hassan, BCRA and the 527 Groups, in THE ELECTION
AFTER REFORM, supra note 151, at 79, 81.
153. Alan J. Cigler, Interest Groups and Financing the 2004 Elections, in FINANCING THE
2004 ELECTION 208, 223 (David B. Magleby, Anthony Corrado & Kelly D. Patterson eds., 2006).
154. Id. at 224-25.
155. Weissman & Hassan, supra note 152, at 92.
156. Id. at 94.
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clearly motivated by access to the candidate (John Kerry) in making
this donation. He is quoted as saying: "I would be very happy to advise
Kerry ....I've been trying to exert some influence over our policies
157
and I hope I'll get a better hearing under Kerry."
The influence of economic power on democracy, and the lack of
success using campaign finance reform to limit that power, suggest
that tax should play a role in curbing excess political power. The role
of wealth in creating political power suggests two design features: (1)
the tax should be applied to some measure of the taxpayer's ability to
control or influence the political process; and (2) the tax should be
applied at the time that control can be exercised. The measure of the
taxpayer's ability to control requires some thought because it
manifests itself in different ways. As discussed above,1 58 a taxpayer
can control the political process through placement of her wealth (i.e.,
the process of selecting her investments) and through campaign
contributions. Persons who have insufficient resources to satisfy basic
needs lack funds to invest or to spend on campaign contributions. A
tax that is designed to help democracy, therefore, should not apply to
persons with few resources. Rather, it should apply to persons with
sufficient resources to enter the political process and to exert influence
through their selection of investments.
C. The Tax Base
Wealth, income, or consumption could be used as a measure of
the resources that enable a person to exert political influence.
Subsection 1 considers the relationship of these potential tax bases to
political power. Subsection 2 discusses the inability of either a wealth
tax, an ideal income tax, or a consumption tax to burden investment
income and the administrative difficulties posed by a wealth tax.
1. General Considerations
Of the three potential tax bases, wealth is arguably the most
accurate measure of a person's ability to affect democracy. Persons
with greater wealth have more to invest and thus can exercise greater
control. As discussed above, the selection of investments can exert
great influence. Similarly, persons with more wealth are able to
contribute more to campaigns.

157. Id. at 86-87 (quoting Jane Mayer, The Money Man, NEW YORKER, Oct. 18, 2004, at 176).
158. See supra Section W.B.1.
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Alternatively, income might be used as the tax base.
Concentrations of income follow the same pattern as concentrations of
59
wealth in countries for which both sets of data are available.'
Income, however, is not as accurate a measure of political power as
wealth because income can vary from political power. For example, it
is possible that a taxpayer can have high income for any given year
but not be able to impact the political process because he earned low
income in prior years.
Consumption bears the most remote relationship to political
power. It is unlikely that amounts of consumption correlate strongly
with wealth and political influence. A person with a net worth of $100
billion probably consumes a significantly smaller percentage of her
income than a person with a net wealth of $1 million. For example, it
has been estimated that Bill Gates would have to consume $25 million
a day to avoid further accumulation of wealth, assuming that his net
worth is $100 billion and that his investment income averaged 10%.160
Recent empirical evidence suggests that wealthy individuals save a
much higher percentage of their income than less advantaged persons.
A 2004 study, using data from the Survey of Consumer Finance, found
that taxpayers in the median quintile of income in the United States
saved only 11% of their income while taxpayers in the top 1% saved
51% of their income. 161 Similarly, an analysis of data from the
Consumer Expenditure Survey found that taxpayers with income over
$200,000 consume only 37% of their income, while taxpayers with
income below $30,000 consume all their income. 162 These studies
suggest that even if progressive rates are used in a consumption tax,
the rates for the wealthiest would have to be confiscatory to collect the
same tax revenue as an income tax.

159. Philippe Aghion et al., Inequality and Economic Growth: The Perspective of the New
Growth Theories, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1615, 1617 (1999); Roberto Perotti, Growth, Income
Distribution and Democracy: What the Data Say, 1 J. ECON. GROWTH 149, 154 (1996). For a
detailed analysis of wealth distribution in the United States, see Martin J. McMahon, The
Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 993, 1017-21 (2004).
160. Christopher D. Carroll, Why Do the Rich Save So Much?, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG?: THE
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 465, 480-81 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000).
161. Karen E. Dynan, Jonathan Skinner & Stephen P. Zeldes, Do the Rich Save More?, 112
J. POL. ECON. 397, 416 tbl. 3 (2004). However, prior studies, primarily from the 1950s and 1960s,
have produced mixed results. Id. at 399-401.
162. Leonard E. Burman & Troy Kravitz, Lower-Income Households Spend Largest Share of
Income, 105 TAX NOTES 875, 875 tbl. (2004).
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2. The Problem of Investment Income and Administrative Difficulties
Despite the differences among tax bases with respect to
political power, the selection of the best tax base is not clear. As
discussed above, political power should be burdened by a tax at the
time that power can be exercised. Because the investment of capital
can be an exercise of political power, 163 a taxpayer's investment
income should be burdened. However, neither a wealth tax, an ideal
income tax, nor a consumption tax burdens most of the income from
investments. 164
A wealth tax faces another major problem that makes it
impractical. A wealth tax must be assessed annually to burden
political power at the time it is exercised. If the tax is assessed over a
longer period, wealth and the accompanying political power will
accrue between assessments. 16 5 An annual wealth tax, however,
requires annual valuations that would overwhelm the IRS and the
judiciary. 166 Valuation is the weakest link in our current estate and
gift tax because valuations are easily manipulated and because the
process of valuation is resource intensive. 167 Currently, less than 2% of
taxpayers are subject to the estate tax. 168 A wealth tax requiring all
163. See supra Section IV.B.l.
164. Technically, the return on an investment can be viewed as consisting of three parts: a
riskless return, a risk premium, and, in some cases, an inframarginal return. Joseph Bankman
& Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate About
Risk? Does it Matter?, 47 TAX L. REV. 377, 387 (1992); No6l B. Cunningham, The Taxation of
Capital Income and the Choice of Tax Base, 52 TAX L. REV. 17, 29-31 (1996); Alvin Warren,
Would a Consumption Tax be FairerThan an Income Tax? 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1097-99 (1980). An
ideal income tax burdens only the riskless and inframarginal returns on investment, while a
cash-flow consumption tax burdens only the inframarginal return, and a wealth tax only the
riskless return. See, e.g., Bankman & Griffith, supra, at 387; Evsey D. Domar & Richard A.
Musgrave, Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-Taking, 58 Q.J. ECON. 388, 389 (1944);
Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 423, 439 (2000);
David Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 499, 517-20
(2000). Because the riskless return historically has been very low-only .06%, STOCKS, BONDS,
BILLS, AND INFLATION 2006 YEARBOOK: VALUATION EDITION 93 (Ibbotson Assocs. 2006), and an
inframarginal return is an extraordinary event, an ideal income, cash-flow consumption, and
wealth tax fail to burden the largest portion of investment income-the risk return.
165. The same revenue derived from an annual wealth tax could be collected in present value
terms by assessing a wealth tax every few years and using a higher tax rate. The difficulty is
that, during the periods in between such assessments, the taxpayer still has the amounts to
invest. As discussed earlier, the selection of investments is an important source of political
power. See supra Section LV.B.1.b.
166. James R. Repetti, Commentary: It's All About Valuation, 53 TAX L. REV. 607, 609-12
(2000).
167. Id.
168. In 2002, only 1.17% of the estates of deceased taxpayers filed an estate tax return. Tax
Policy Center, 1934-2002 (July 10, 2007), available at http://taxpolicycenter.org/TaxFacts/TFDB/
TFTemplate.cfm?Docid=52&Topic2id=60.
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U.S. taxpayers to file returns based on annual valuations would be too
unwieldy. 16 9 Based on these impracticalities, this Article eliminates
the wealth tax as a viable alternative and focuses on the consumption
tax and income tax.
a. Consumption Tax
While a consumption tax does not have the administrative
problem of a wealth tax, it cannot curb political power because it does
not burden investment income. Investments are a major source of
political power 170 and represent a significant portion of the receipts of
wealthy individuals. For example, in 2000, capital gains accounted for
over 57% of the adjusted gross income of taxpayers with $10 million or
more of income and 12% of the income for taxpayers with adjusted
gross incomes between $200,000 and $500,000. In contrast, it
represented an insignificant amount for taxpayers with lower
incomes. 171 Similarly, in 2000, capital gain, dividend, and interest
income represented 76% of the adjusted gross income of the 400
taxpayers in the United States with the highest adjusted gross
172
incomes.
A review of the different types of consumption tax and their
impact on investment income clarifies why a consumption tax does not
burden investment income. A prepaid consumption tax (also referred
to as a wage tax), taxes the taxpayer's wage income but exempts his
investment income.1 7 3 For example, a Roth IRA is a prepaid
consumption tax because the taxpayer pays an income tax on the
amount deposited in the IRA but does not pay any tax on the amounts
withdrawn.1 74 Regardless of how progressive this type of consumption
tax is made, it will never burden the return on investment. Because
the return on investment is never taxed, a prepaid consumption tax
does not impair the taxpayer's ability to influence the political process
through placement of investments and campaign contributions.
Another type of consumption tax is a postpaid tax, such as a
cash flow tax where the taxpayer includes all income in the tax base
169. Id.
170. See supra Section IV.B..b.
171. Leonard E. Burman & Deborah I. Kobes, Composition of Income Reported on Tax
Returns, 101 TAX NOTES 783, 783 (2003).
172. Tax Policy Center, Tax Facts: Returns of Taxpayers with the Top 400 Adjusted Gross
Income, 1992-2005 (Mar. 7, 2008), available at http://taxpolicycenter.org/TaxFacts/TFDB/
TFTemplate.cfm?Docid=260.
173. See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 12, at 824 (explaining impact of prepaid consumption
tax on investment income).
174. Id.
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but is allowed to deduct amounts invested. 175 Taxation of investment
income is deferred until the taxpayer withdraws the investment for
consumption. At that time, the entire amount of the initial investment
and the income earned thereon is taxed. A cash flow tax with a flat tax
rate exempts the investment income from tax, except where the return
is a rare form, referred to as an "inframarginar' return. 176
The exemption of investment income by a postpaid
consumption tax with a flat rate is illustrated by the following
example. 177 Suppose a taxpayer subject to a cash flow type
consumption tax with a flat rate of 50% decides to invest $200 in year
one in an investment that yields 10%. Because a cash flow
consumption tax allows a deduction for amounts invested, the
taxpayer's investment of $200 in year one generates a $200 deduction.
This deduction saves him $100 in taxes that also can be invested,
which in turn will generate another deduction. If the taxpayer
continues to invest his tax savings from each successive investment,
he eventually will have invested an additional $200.178 At the end of
year two, he will have his investment of $400 (the investment of $200
plus the additional investment from tax savings of $200) and $40 of
investment income. When he consumes his investment in year two, he
will pay a tax of $220 (50% of $440), leaving him with $220 to
consume. In effect, his investment income has not been burdened
because his initial investment was $200 and he earned $20 thereon (a
10% return). Because the postpaid consumption tax fails to burden

175. A cash-flow tax was first discussed in legal literature in William D. Andrews, A
Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1113 (1974).
176. Inframarginal returns are usually associated with new ideas, monopolies, or managerial
skill. R. Glenn Hubbard, Prospects for FundamentalTax Reform: How Different are Income and
Consumption Taxes?, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 138, 139 (1997). Other than monopolies, inframarginal
returns are usually returns on labor-the invention of a better computer operating system or the
effective management of an organization represent the fruits of the labor of the inventor or
manager. For a discussion of the different types of investment returns, see supra note 164.
177. This example is based on Example 1 in Alvin C. Warren, How Much Capital Income
Taxed Under an Income Tax is Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax?, 52 TAx L. REV. 1, 3 (1996).
178. The additional amount of the tax savings that taxpayer will be able to reinvest as a
result of being able to deduct each successive amount is equal to the amount of the initial
investment multiplied by t/(1 - t), where t is the tax rate. See, e.g., id. (discussing this example).
It is important to note that this formula assumes that the amount of the initial investment
already has been accounted for fully in the tax base. For example, if taxpayer received wages of
$100, you could not multiply that $100 by t/(1 - t) to determine the additional amount of tax
savings that could be invested. The taxpayer who received $100 in wages could invest only $100
because that amount already includes his tax savings attributable to deducting the $100
investment from his $100 of wages. To see this, consider that $100 of wages would have allowed
taxpayer to consume $60 and pay a consumption tax of $40. The amount remaining after taxes,
$60, would have generated an additional $40 of tax savings if invested, as can be seen by
applying the tJ(1 -t) formula: $60 x .40/(1 -. 4) = $40.
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return on investment, it likewise fails to impair the taxpayer's
influence on the political process through placement of investments
and campaign contributions. As an aside, note that the taxpayer's
return was not burdened because he was able to invest his tax savings
in an investment that yielded the same return as his initial
investment. If the taxpayer instead invested his tax savings in an
179
investment yielding a lower amount, his return would be burdened.
It is thought that inframarginal returns are restricted in the amount
that can be invested, with the result that inframarginal returns are
burdened in a postpaid consumption tax.180
The foregoing example involved a postpaid consumption tax
with flat rates. A postpaid consumption tax with progressive rates
burdens investment income if the taxpayer's consumption is taxed at a
rate higher than the rate that applied at the time the investment was
made.18 1 Consider a cash flow tax that applies a tax rate of 50% to the
first $200 of taxable cash flow and 60% thereafter. If in year one a
taxpayer invests $200, her deduction in year one will save her $100 in
taxes. If she invests that $100 of tax savings and continues to invest
the tax savings from each successive investment, she will have
invested an additional $200.182 If the total investment of $400 (the
initial $200 investment plus the $200 of tax savings) yields 10%, she
will have $440 at the end of year two. When she consumes that
amount, she will pay a tax of $232 (50% of the first $200 and 60% of
the remaining $220), meaning that she will have $208 after tax to
consume. Her investment income has been burdened because with no
tax she would have $220 (her initial investment of $200 plus the $20
earned thereon). Note that if the applicable tax rate had remained at
50% when she consumed her savings, she would have had $220 to

179. For example, if the taxpayer had been able to receive only a 5% return on his
investment of the $200 of tax savings, he would have $430 to consume at the end of the year
($210 attributable to the tax savings and the 5% yield thereon, and $220 attributable to the $200
original investment and the 10% yield thereon). Consumption would generate a tax of $215 (50%
of 230), leaving him with a net consumption of $215, a worse position than he would have been in
the no tax world where he would have consumed $220. See Warren, supra note 177, at 3
(discussing this example); see also Cunningham, supra note 164, at 26-29 (discussing similar
examples).
180. See supra note 176 for an explanation of inframarginal returns.
181. See McCaffery, supranote 12, at 854-55.
182. See supra text accompanying note 178. As discussed in note 178, the total amount of the
tax savings that taxpayer will be able to be reinvest as a result of being able to deduct each
successive amount is equal to the amount of the initial investment multiplied by t/(1 - t), where t
is the tax rate. We assume that the 50% rate would apply to the amount of tax savings generated
on successive investments.
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consume. l 3 Her investment income is only burdened if a higher rate
applies at the time of consumption.
Although the progressive cash flow tax may burden investment
income, it does not satisfy our conditions for democracy for several
reasons. First, a progressive consumption tax only burdens savings if
the taxpayer is in a higher bracket when the savings are consumed
compared to when the saving occurred. In other words, the taxpayer's
savings are only burdened when her level of consumption is greater
than it was during the period in which the savings occurred.1 8 4 If the
taxpayer never increases her level of consumption, then the return on
investment will never be burdened. In addition, even when the
savings are burdened, the timing is inappropriate. The savings are
only burdened when consumption occurs. Until then, the taxpayer has
an unfettered and continuous ability to influence politics by virtue of
controlling where she places her investments. Lastly, depending on
the design of the consumption tax, the act of contributing to political
campaigns only will be taxed if donations are treated as consumption.
Professor Shaviro argues that a consumption tax burdens
political power.' 8 ' He asserts that political power is based on "what it
can be used to buy." Because consumption is taxed when it occurs, he
argues that the presence of the tax, as an unavoidable liability,
reduces purchasing power and thereby reduces political power. He
states:
Why does wealth offer security, political power, and social standing? The answer must
be because of its value-that is because of what it can be used to buy.... [A] postpaid
consumption tax affects what the wealth one holds can be used to buy. It is no different
in that regard than an arm's-length liability that one incurs to defray the cost of a
prepaid tax. Even when wealthy people make bequests to their heirs from motives of
benevolence, a postpaid consumption tax affects the benefits they are conveying-that is
the amount that the heirs can buy. Murphy and Nagel fail to recognize that savings and
wealth are indeed subsidiary to consumption in that they derive their value entirely
form that potential use, whether its exercise is proximate or not. The ability to buy
things is, after all, the difference
between real money and play money from board games
186
such as Monopoly and Life.

This statement does not consider that political control arises
from the placement of investments as well as from political
contributions.1 8 7 A taxpayer's decision about where to locate a factory

183. When taxpayer consumes $440 in year 2, she will pay a tax of $220 (50% of $440), which
means that she will have $220 to consume.
184. McCaffery, supra note 12, at 855.
185. Shaviro, supra note 44, at 106; see also Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 4, at 1436-37,
1449 (making the same argument).
186. Shaviro, supra note 44, at 106.
187. See supra Section IV.B.1.b.
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or in which bank to deposit a large sum has significant political
impact.188 Moreover, in the popular versions of a cash flow
consumption tax, most business expenditures are immediately
deductible. 18 9 Placements of advertisements and purchases of supplies
are expenditures that are not taxed to the payer in a cash flow
consumption tax, but they nevertheless exert as much political
influence as direct campaign contributions. 190 The result is that a
consumption tax fails to burden a significant portion of political power
as compared to a progressive income tax, even if political contributions
are treated as taxable consumption.
b. Income Tax
Initially, the income tax does not appear any better than the
consumption tax. Like a consumption tax, an ideal income tax does not
burden most of the return from investments if certain conditions are
satisfied.1 91 For an ideal income tax to exempt investment income, all
losses must be fully deductible, the tax rate applicable to such losses
must be the same rate applied to gains, and investors must take
advantage of the full deductibility of losses by increasing their
1 92
investment in risky assets.
The following example illustrates how an ideal income tax fails
to burden most investment income when these conditions are
satisfied. Suppose that a taxpayer is considering an investment of
$100 that has a 50% chance of either earning 40% or losing 20%. To
keep this example simple, assume that this return consists entirely of
risk return and that the riskless and inframarginal returns are
zero.1 93 The taxpayer's potential results in a tax-free world are
depicted in Table 2.

188. See supra Section IV.B.1.b.
189. See, e.g., James M. Bickley, Flat Tax: An Overview of the Hall-Rabushka Proposal, 72
TAX NOTES 97, 99 (1996) (describing expenditures that would be deductible under the HallRabushka flat tax proposal); Paul H. O'Neill & Robert A. Lutz, Unlimited Savings Allowance
(USA) Tax System, 66 TAX NOTES 1482, 1492-93 (1995) (describing business expenditures that
may be deducted under the USA Tax System). A significant difference between the USA Tax and
Hall-Rabushka proposals is their treatment of wages. The USA Tax would not permit businesses
to deduct wages, while the Hal-Rabushka proposal would.
190. See supra Section IV.B..b
191. The risk return from investments, which usually represents most of an investment
return, is not burdened by an ideal income tax. See supra note 164.
192. See e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, The Sometimes-Taxation of the Returns to Risk Bearing
Under a ProgressiveIncome Tax, 59 SMU L. REV. 879, 891 (2006).
193. For a discussion of the different components of investment income, see supranote 164.
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TABLE 2
Tax Free
Risky Investment

Lucky
$100 + $40 = $140

Unlucky
$100 - $20 = $80

Percent Return

40%

(20%)

The taxpayer's expected return is 10% in a tax-free world. 194
If we assume a 20% tax, and full deductibility of losses,
taxpayer's results are depicted in Table 3.

TABLE 3
Taxable at 20%
Risky Investment
Tax (Expense) Benefit
After-Tax Income
Percent Return

-

Lucky

Unlucky

$100 + 40 = $140
20% x $40 =($8)

$100 - $20 = $80
20% x ($20) = $4

$132
32%

$84
(16%)

The 20% tax reduces the taxpayer's expected return to 8%.195 Note
that the ability to deduct the loss of $20 in the unlucky scenario
generates a tax savings of $4.
The taxpayer can eliminate the tax burden in the lucky
scenario by increasing his investment in the risky investment by a
factor of 1/1-t, where t is the tax rate. Assume that the taxpayer
borrows $25, paying $1 of interest (which represents an interest
charge of 4%196) and increases his investment to $125.197 The possible
outcomes are depicted in Table 4.

194. Taxpayer has a gain of 40% in the lucky scenario and a loss of 20% in the unlucky
scenario. The expected value of the return is .5(40% - 20%) = 10%.
195. Taxpayer has a gain of 32% in the lucky scenario and a loss of 16% in the unlucky
scenario. The expected value of his return is .5(32% - 16%) = 8%.
196. 4% x 25 = 1.
197. 1/(1 - .2) = 25.
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TABLE 4
Portfolio Adjustments
Assuming Loss Deduction
Lucky

Unlucky

Risky Investment
Interest Expense

$125 + $50 = $175.00
($1.00)

$125 - $25 = $100.00
($1.00)

Tax (Expense) Benefit
Loan Repayment
After-Tax Income
Percent Return

20% x $49 = ($9.80)
($25.00)

20% x ($26) = $5.20
($25.00)

$139.20
39.2%

$79.20
(20.8%)

The taxpayer's total after-tax return of $139.20 if he is lucky and
$79.20 if unlucky is almost identical to his position in the tax-free
world-where he had $140 if lucky and $80 if unlucky. The difference
in each scenario of $0.80 represents the after-tax interest cost of the
loan.1 98 His expected return in this scenario is 9.2%199, which is also
0.8% less than his expected return in the no tax world. That $0.80
reduction in expected return represents the cost of the after-tax
interest (0.8%) as a percentage of his net investment of $100.200 The
taxpayer's after-tax return increased with a larger investment because
he was able to deduct his interest expense and loss in the unlucky
scenario, thereby generating a tax savings of $5.20.
While these examples demonstrate that an ideal income tax
exempts investment income, a major problem exists in the real world.
There is no evidence that investors employ the portfolio adjustment
technique described above. None of the portfolio managers for hedge
funds and mutual funds to whom I have spoken take advantage of this
opportunity by grossing up their investments. Moreover, as David
Weisbach notes, standard public finance texts either ignore or give
20 1
short shrift to this option.
The conditions that must exist for the portfolio adjustments to
work are restrictive. For an ideal tax to eliminate the burden on
investment income, all losses must be fully deductible, the tax rate
applicable to losses must be the same as the rate for gains, and
198. The interest expense of $1 generated a tax benefit of $0.20 (.2 x $1), which means that
the after-tax cost of the interest charge is $0.80.
199. Taxpayer's gain in the lucky scenario is 39.2% and his loss is 20.8%. The expected value
of his return is .5(39.2% - 20.8%) = 9.2%.
200. The interest expense of $1 generated a tax benefit of .2 (.2 x $1), which means that the
after-tax cost of the interest charge is $0.80. This interest charge of $0.80 is .8% of the net
investment of $100 (.8/100 = .008).
201. David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk, 58 TAx L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2004).
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investors must be able to make portfolio adjustments that reflect the
fact that losses can be deducted fully (i.e., by increasing investment in
a risky asset).20 2 These conditions do not exist in our actual income tax
system, which limits loss deductions in several ways. For example,
interest expenses incurred on debt used for investments can be
deducted only to the extent of investment'income, 203 losses generally
204
cannot be deducted to the extent financed by nonrecourse debt,
passive activity losses generally are deductible only to the extent of
passive activity income or when the taxpayer disposes of her entire
interest in the passive activity, 20 5 and capital losses of individuals are
20 6
deductible only against capital gains and $3000 of ordinary income.
In addition, because we have a progressive tax, some taxpayers have
losses deducted at rates that are lower than the rates applicable to
20 7
their gains.
Our system's limitation on loss deductions and its progressive
rate structure discourage taxpayers from increasing their investment
in the risky asset in an attempt to eliminate the tax on the risk
return. Indeed, as shown below, increased investment in the risky
asset may place the taxpayer in a worse position than he would have
been had he not made the adjustments and paid the entire tax! To
illustrate this, recall that in the above example, the portfolio
adjustment eliminated most of the burden on the investment return
because we assumed that the taxpayer could fully deduct his loss and
interest expense if he were unlucky, thereby generating a tax benefit
of $5.20. If he is not able to deduct the loss and interest expense when
he is unlucky, he actually would be temporarily worse off than he was
in the taxable world as a result of his portfolio adjustments, as
depicted in Table 5.

202. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Taxation and Risk Taking: A General Equilibrium Perspective,
47 NAT'L TAX J. 789-90 (1994); Zelenak, supra note 192, at 891.
203. I.R.C. § 163(i) (2008).
204. I.R.C. § 465 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
205. I.R.C. § 469.
206. I.R.C. § 1211(b) (2000). Capital losses of corporations are only deductible against capital
gains-corporations do not have the benefit of also deducting the losses against $3,000 of
ordinary income. I.R.C. § 1211(a).
207. Zelenak, supra note 192, at 901. Professor Zelenak points out, however, that it is likely
that the very rich do not deduct losses at lower rates than their gains are taxed, because our
maximum tax rate of 35% applies to incomes over $349,700 for married individuals filing a joint
return in 2007. It is likely that most wealthy taxpayers are deducting losses and reporting gains
at the same rate. In addition, since capital losses primarily are deducted against capital gains,
the same rate generally will apply to those losses and gains for most taxpayers.
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TABLE 5
Portfolio Adjustments
Assuming No Loss Deduction
Lucky

Unlucky

Risky Investment

$125 + $50 = $175.00

$125 - $25 = $100.00

Interest Expense

($1.00)

($1.00)

Tax (Expense) Benefit

20% x $49 = ($9.80)

$0

Loan Repayment

($25.00)

($25.00)

After-Tax Income

$139.20

$74.00

Percent Return

39.2%

(26%)

The taxpayer's inability to deduct his loss and interest expense
will decrease his expected return to 6.6%,208 a return that is worse
than the 8% he had in the taxable world with no portfolio
adjustments. This lower return will increase, however, when he
eventually is able to deduct the expenses. If we assume a 10% discount
rate, 20 9 he must deduct his loss and interest expense within seven
210
years of incurring them to avoid a permanently lower return.
A seven-year window may not seem like a serious impediment,
but the period will be shorter if the interest expense on the loan is
higher or the appropriate discount rate for calculating the present
value of the tax benefits is greater. Moreover, the taxpayer may never
be able to improve his position to that of the taxable world with no
portfolio adjustment if he is in a lower tax bracket when he finally is
able to recognize the deduction. For example, even if the taxpayer is
able to deduct the suspended losses the following year, he will be
worse off than he would have been without portfolio adjustments if his

208. If taxpayer cannot deduct the $25 loss and $1 interest expense, he finishes with $74 in
the unlucky scenario. Thus, the outcomes are a net gain of $39.20 if lucky and a net loss of $26 if
unlucky on a net investment of $100. This results in an expected return of .5(39.2% - 26%)
6.6%.
209. This seems reasonable, given the taxpayer's willingness to invest in an asset having an
expected return of 10%.
210. In order for the taxpayer to achieve the 8% expected return that he would have received
in the tax world with no portfolio adjustments, the present value of the tax benefit arising from
his eventual deduction of the suspended $25 loss and $1 interest expense must equal $2.80 or
more. To see this, consider that a present value of tax benefits of $2.80 would increase the return
in the unlucky scenario with portfolio adjustments from $74 with no tax benefit to $76.80. This
would yield an expected return of .5(39.2% - 23.2%) = 8%. The present value of a $5.20 tax
benefit (20% multiplied by the suspended loss of $25 and interest expense of $1) equals $2.80
only if the expenses generating that benefit are deducted no later than seven years after the
expenses are incurred.
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effective tax rate at the time of deduction is reduced from 20% to
10%.211

These uncertainties introduce additional risk that may deter
taxpayers from engaging in the portfolio adjustments that
theoretically enable them to eliminate tax on their risky income.
Whatever the explanation, the wealthiest taxpayers are not
eliminating tax on their investment income. Evidence suggests that
our progressive tax system, as imperfect as it is,212 imposes a heavier
burden on high-income taxpayers, who earn the bulk of their income
from investments, than on low-income taxpayers. Thomas Piketty and
Emmanuek Saez, in reviewing income inequality in the United States
in the twentieth century, remark on the steep decline in the
concentration of capital income that occurred during that century:
How can we explain the steep secular decline in capital income concentration [through
1987]?... The most natural and realistic candidate for an explanation seems to be the
creation and the development of the progressive income tax (and of the progressive
estate tax and corporate tax). The very large fortunes that generated the top 0.01
percent incomes observed at the beginning of the century were accumulated during the
The fiscal
nineteenth century, at a time where progressive taxes hardly existed ....
situation faced by capitalists in the twentieth century ... has been substantially
different. Top tax rates were very high from the end of World War I to the early 1920's
and then continuously from 1932 to the mid-1980's.... These very high marginal rates
applied to only a very small fraction of taxpayers, but created a substantial burden on
as the top 0.1 percent and 0.01 percent) composed
the very top income groups2 1 (such
3
primarily of capital income.

The explanation by Picketty and Saez is consistent with other
evidence. A recent analysis of the U.S. system found that, in 2007, the
effective individual income tax rate on taxpayers in the top 0.1% of
income was 19.3%, compared to an effective tax rate of negative 5.0%
for taxpayers in the lowest quintile. 214 Because investment income in
the form of capital gains accounted for 57% of the total adjusted gross
income of taxpayers with incomes of $10 million or more in 2000, it is
215
likely that investment income of the wealthy is being taxed.
211. As discussed supra note 210, in order for the taxpayer to achieve the 8% expected return
that he would have received in the taxable world without a portfolio adjustment, he would have
to obtain a present value benefit from the deduction of the suspended loss and interest expense
equal to $2.80. If taxpayer's effective tax rate is 10% when he deducts the $26 of suspended
expenses, he will never reach the required $2.80 benefit, because the maximum tax benefit he
could obtain would be $2.60 (.1 x $26).
212. Our current income tax could be improved significantly with regard to the taxation of
investment income. For an excellent critique, see, e.g., McMahon, supra note 159, at 1017-21.
213. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998,
118 Q.J. ECON. 1, 21-23 (2003) (internal citations omitted).
214. Jeffrey Rohaly, The Distributionof Federal Taxes, 115 TAX NOTES 1293, 1293 (2007).
215. Burman & Kobes, supra note 171, at 783; see also Joel Slemrod, Does the United States
Tax Capital Income?, in TAXING CAPITAL INCOME 3, 16 (Henry J. Aaron, Leonard E. Burman &
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Consistent with this analysis, high-income taxpayers pay a
disproportionate amount of tax in our current progressive system. The
top 0.5% of taxpayers in the United States paid approximately 24% of
all income taxes collected in 1995, and the majority of their income
was investment income. 216 Thus, strong evidence suggests that an
annual income tax that limits the deductibility of investment losses
burdens high-income taxpayers even though they receive the bulk of
2 17
their income from investments.
D. Rate Structure
Both a proportional and a progressive income tax impose
greater burdens on taxpayers with greater resources so long as the tax
base reflects those resources. However, the relationship between
political influence and wealth is likely a step function. Persons with
little wealth have no power because all of their resources are devoted
to basic needs. In contrast, persons with great resources have political
power because they have significant amounts to invest and to

C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2007) (finding that, in the years 2002-2004, the effective U.S. tax rate
on capital income ranged from 14% to 23%, depending on the measurement method that was
used).
216. Daniel R. Feenberg & James M. Poterba, Taxing the Rich: The Income and Tax Share of
Very High-Income Households, 1960-1995, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 264, 268 (2000).
217. For an insightful critique of our current tax system's taxation of investment income, see
Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax With a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 423, 429-33
(2000). Schenk argues that low-income taxpayers may bear a greater burden than wealthy
taxpayers on investment income, because high-income taxpayers probably can minimize the tax
on investment income more readily than low-income taxpayers through sophisticated tax
planning. While it is true that high-income individuals do engage in more tax planning than lowincome taxpayers, it does not follow that we should abandon imposing an income tax on
investment income. As discussed above, high-income taxpayers are not eliminating the income
tax on investment income. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the burden on low-income taxpayers
is significant. Most investment income is reported by high-income individuals, not low-income
individuals. In 2000, families with adjusted gross incomes ("AGI") of $75,000 to $100,000 had
capital gains that comprised less than 5% of their total AGI. In contrast, investment income in
the form of capital gains accounted for 57% of the total adjusted gross income of taxpayers with
incomes of $10 million or more. Burman & Kobes, supra note 171, at 783. Moreover, there is
evidence that even large corporations, the most sophisticated taxpayers, frequently are limited
by restrictions on the use of losses and credits despite their extensive tax planning. See Roseanne
Altshuler & Alan J. Auerbach, The Significance of Tax Law Asymmetries: An Empirical
Investigation, 105 Q.J. ECON. 61, 69-72 (1990) (finding that, in 1982, approximately one half of
corporations, weighted by asset size, were fully taxable and that an additional 29% paid taxes
while they still had unused investment credits); Alan J. Auerbach, Why Have CorporateRevenues
Declined? Another Look 18 (unpublished manuscript, presented at NYU School of Law
Colloquium on Tax Policy and Public Finance, Spring 2007), http://www.law.nyu.edu/colloquia/
taxpolicy/papers/07/AlanAuerbachSp07.pdf ("The recent upward spike in the average tax rate is
largely attributable to the importance of tax losses, and casts some doubt on the importance of
tax planning activities as a vehicle for reducing taxes.").
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contribute to political campaigns. 218 This suggests that a tax on
political power should apply to persons with great wealth, but not to
persons with few resources. That is, the tax rate imposed on less
advantaged individuals should not include an assessment on political
power, but an increment should be added to the rate for wealthy
individuals to burden political power. This increase is, of course, a
progressive rate structure. The increase could be accomplished in two
steps, or many steps could be used to provide a less abrupt transition.
Despite the imperfections of our current progressive tax
system, statistics indicate that high-income taxpayers carry a heavier
burden than low-income taxpayers. Table 6, which depicts data
prepared by the Congressional Budget Office, indicates that the share
of after-tax income of taxpayers in the highest quintile is lower than
21 9
their share of pre-tax income.
TABLE 6
Share of Income for 2002-03
Quintile

Pre-Tax Income

Post-Tax Income

First
Second

4.3%
9.3%

5.2%
10.4%

Third
Fourth

14.6%
21.0%

15.7%
21.6%

Highest

51.6%

48.2%

In addition, a recent study measured the impact of taxes on the
0
Gini coefficient, a measure of inequality, for the period 1979-2002.22

In comparing pre-tax income to post-tax income, it found that federal
income taxation decreased the Gini coefficient for all years. This
means that the federal income tax has imposed heavier burdens on
high-income individuals than on low-income individuals. These results
are reproduced in Table 7.

218. See supra Section IV.B.1 (discussing the impact of income wealth on democracy).
219. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, HISTORICAL EFFECTIVE FEDERAL TAX RATES 1979 TO

2003, at 5 (2005), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/70xx/doc7000/12-29-FedTaxRates.pdf.
220. MICHAEL STRUDLER, TOM PETSKA & RYAN PETSKA, FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND TAXES, 1979-2002, at 8-9 (2004), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-

soi/04asastr.pdf.
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TABLE 7
Year

Gini Before

Gini After

Difference

Percent

1979

Tax
0.469

Tax
0.439

0.030

Difference
6.325

1980
1981

0.471
0.471

0.441
0.442

0.031
0.029

6.477
6.233

1982

0.474

0.447

0.027

1983
1984

0.482
0.490

0.458
0.466

0.025
0.024

5.731
5.132
4.933

1985

0.496

0.471

0.024

4.860

1986
1987
1988

0.520
0.511
0.530

0.496
0.485
0.505

0.024
0.026
0.026

4.573
5.101
4.817

1989
1990
1991

0.528
0.527
0.523

0.504
0.503
0.499

0.024

4.592

0.024
0.024

4.498
4.582

1992

0.532

0.507

0.025

4.709

1993
1994

0.531
0.532

0.503
0.503

0.028
0.028

5.207
5.292

1995

0.540

0.510

0.029

5.404

1996
1997

0.551
0.560

0.521
0.530

0.030
0.030

5.496
5.368

1998
1999

0.570
0.580

0.541
0.550

0.029
0.030

5.136
5.185

2000

0.588

0.558

0.031

5.222

2001

0.564

0.534

0.030

5.352

2002

0.555

0.525

0.030

5.339

E. Summary
Designing a tax to achieve equality of opportunity for selfrealization and participation in the democratic process leads to a
progressive income tax. Although an annual wealth tax targets
wealth-the major source of political power-valuation difficulties
make it impractical. A consumption tax also does not work well
because it is ineffective in curbing disproportionate political power.
Very wealthy individuals consume a small percentage of their
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income, 221 and a consumption tax does not generally tax investment
income. 222 Thus, wealthy investors enjoy the economic and political
power attributable to the placement of their wealth and the return
thereon without any tax burden. A postpaid consumption tax with a
progressive rate burdens investment income, but only at the time that
the yield is spent in the form of taxable consumption and only if the
tax rate at the time of consumption exceeds the rate at the time of
investment. Thus, under a progressive consumption tax, the taxpayer
enjoys the economic and political power associated with her wealth
unfettered by tax while the taxpayer's investment is accruing income.
Moreover, if her tax rate at the time of consumption is not greater
than the rate at the time of investment, the investment income
escapes taxation. In contrast, experience shows that a progressive
income tax does tax investment income in the United States.
Taxpayers do not appear to use the portfolio adjustments that
eliminate tax on the risk return in an ideal income tax. This failure
may reflect the taxpayer's aversion to the risk of ending up in a worse
economic situation with portfolio adjustments than she would in a
fully taxable situation because of the application of loss limitations or
changes in the applicable tax rates.
V. A RESPONSE TO OTHER ARGUMENTS FOR A CONSUMPTION TAX
Section IV argued that equal opportunity for self-realization
and equal participation in the democratic process should motivate the
design of a tax system. A progressive income tax that burdens
investment income is the best design for achieving these goals. In
addition, attaining these goals may have positive efficiency effects by
increasing productivity. Other equity and efficiency concerns,
however, may cause one to prefer a consumption tax. The remainder of
this Article addresses those major concerns. This Part does not
catalogue all of the remaining equity and efficiency concerns that
pertain to the choice of an income tax over a consumption tax, but
instead raises issues most pertinent to this Article.
A. Equity

it

One argument often advanced for the consumption tax is that
does not discriminate against future consumption because

221. See supra text accompanying notes 160-62 (noting that wealthy individuals save a
higher percentage of their income than other individuals).
222. For a discussion of situations in which a consumption tax will burden investment
income, see supra text accompanying notes 170-84.
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investment income is not burdened. 223 In contrast, because an income
tax burdens the return on investment, it discriminates against saving
for future consumption. Many have challenged the legitimacy of this
view as an important distributive justice issue. Alvin Warren, for
example, argues that it is inappropriate to determine a tax policy's
fairness based on the taxpayer's expectations about future
consumption, rather than on what actually has occurred. 224 Alan Gunn
asserts that discounting future consumption to present value is
inappropriate because timing is part of consumption:
Suppose a taxpayer who could expect to receive a secure income of $10,000 a year for the
next ten years was offered, as an alternative, a present lump-sum payment of $100,000.
Ignoring any possible effects of a progressive income tax, any rational person would
accept the offer, since the opportunity for an investment return makes $100,000 now
worth more than $10,000 a year for ten years to anyone. But it is surely not the case
that any rational person who expected to consume $10,000 per year for the next ten
years and who could give up that opportunity in exchange for $100,000 consumption
225
this year on condition he consume nothing for nine years, would accept the offer.

Advocates of a consumption tax also argue that protecting
investment income from taxation properly compensates taxpayers for
the pain of deferring consumption. However, Professor Warren has
countered that normally we ignore psychic benefits and costs in our
tax system. He quips, "One might as well argue for excluding wages as
merely offsetting the pain of working. '226 Marvin Chirelstein similarly
asserts that citizens may have difficulty embracing the notion that a
consumption tax is unfair because it discriminates between current
and future consumption:
While there is force to these arguments most Americans would have difficulty
recognizing the consumption tax as superior in fairness and equity to a broad-based
income tax. The reason for this is that people do not regard saving as an act of selfdenial where high-income taxpayers are concerned, or as mere postponed consumption.
In our day at least, saving generally appears to take place only after all reasonable
consumption preferences have been fully satisfied, and hence sometimes appears to be
the ultimate luxury. It is hard to believe that a taxpayer who finds himself at the year's
end with residual income which he elects to2invest
in the stock market should thereby
27
effectively reduce his obligation to pay taxes.

In resolving this debate, it is helpful to ascertain how much
investment income actually represents remuneration for deferring

223. Andrews, supra note 175, at 1116-17.
224. Warren, supra note 164, at 1098; see also Mark G. Kelman, Time Preference and Tax
Equity, 35 STAN. L. REV. 649, 656 (1983) (noting that the discount rate is simply "an expression
of ex ante time preference, which disappears ex post").
225. Alan Gunn, The Casefor an Income Tax, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 370, 375-76 (1979).
226. Warren, supra note 164, at 1107.
227. Marvin A. Chirelstein, Back from the Dead: How President Reagan Saved the Income
Tax, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 207, 217-18 (1986) (emphasis added).
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consumption. Some have suggested that interest represents a
payment for the act of deferring consumption. 228 But this is too
simplistic. Interest also represents a payment to give up control of the
invested capital and to undertake a risk that repayment may not
occur. 229 The portion of investment income that is not paid for risk230
the riskless return-represents payment for deferring consumption.
Because the real riskless return is 0.6%,231 only that amount need be
excluded from taxation to avoid discriminating between current and
future consumption.
It hardly seems worth moving to a consumption tax to avoid
imposing a tax on a 0.6% return. But if we exempt all investment
income from taxation, the government would be subsidizing investors'
risk return. This subsidy creates a serious equity problem. Why
should the government subsidize risky investments while
simultaneously taxing labor? One could rephrase the issue and ask
why the government should subsidize risky investments in capital and
not subsidize risky investment in labor. Is there a reason that one
should be favored over the other? It could be argued that investments
in labor, not capital, should be subsidized because the pain from labor
losses is greater for taxpayers than the pain from capital losses.
Research suggests that a 1% increase in unemployment reduces
welfare significantly more than a 1% increase in inflation. 232 It is
possible that up to two thirds of the welfare decrease experienced by
the unemployed is attributable to nonpecuniary losses such as lower
233 Most
self esteem, boredom, and less structure in their lives.
important from the perspective of this Article, exempting savings from
taxation conflicts with the principles of equality of opportunity for selfrealization and participation in democracy.
B. Efficiency Concerns
The fact that an income tax is better than a consumption tax at
establishing the conditions necessary for equality of opportunity for
self-realization and participation in the political process settles only
part of the debate about which tax is better. Efficiency concerns play
an important role as well.
228. IRVING FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST 61-98 (1930).

229. Bankman & Griffith, supra note 164, at 387; Warren, supra note 164, at 1097-99.
230. Bankman & Griffith, supranote 164, at 387.
231. STOCKS, BONDS, BILLS, AND INFLATION 2006 YEARBOOK, supra note 164, at 93.
232. FREY & STUTZER, supra note 82, at 99-100; Thomas D. Griffith, Progressive Taxation
and Happiness, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1363, 1392 (2004).
233. FREY & STUTZER, supra note 82, at 99-100.

2008]

DEMOCRACY AND OPPORTUNITY

1181

Economists often measure the efficiency of a tax in terms of its
"excess burden." The excess burden represents the welfare loss created
by a tax that exceeds the tax revenue generated by that tax. All taxes
234
that are based on a taxpayer's activity create an excess burden.
Only a lump sum tax, which is not based on the taxpayer's behavior,
avoids an excess burden. An income tax always has an excess burden
because it creates a disparity between the income paid to the taxpayer
and the after-tax income received by the taxpayer. This difference
causes the taxpayer to change his behavior from what it would be in a
tax-free world. For example, a tax on wages may influence a taxpayer
to work more or less hours. Similarly, a tax on savings may cause a
taxpayer to save more or less. This behavioral change creates a
welfare loss to the taxpayer in addition to the taxes paid 235 because
the tax distorts his behavior.
The income tax imposes an excess burden on a taxpayer's
decision to consume or save by taxing the return on savings. In
addition, an income tax imposes an excess burden on the taxpayer's
decision between work and leisure. A consumption tax, in contrast,
only distorts the work-leisure decision. It does not distort the save236
consume decision because it generally does not burden savings.
Some economists argue that, although an income tax imposes burdens
on both the work-leisure and consume-save decisions, it does not
necessarily impose a greater excess burden than the consumption
tax. 237 Instead, they suggest that the magnitude of the excess burdens
will depend on the elasticities of savings and work in response to
tax.

23 8

Joseph Bankman and David Weisbach argue that an ideal
239
consumption tax is always more efficient than an ideal income tax.
234. JANE G. GRAVELLE, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TAXING CAPITAL INCOME 30 (1994); John

Creedy, The Excess Burden of Taxation and Why It (Approximately) Quadruples When the Tax
Rate Doubles 17 (New Zealand Treasury, Working Paper 03/29, 2003), available at
http://www.treasury.gov.nz/publications/research-policy/wp/2003/03-29/twpO3-29.pdf. The excess
burden is a function of the elasticity of the compensated demand curve for the item being taxed
and the square of the tax exclusive tax rate. The elasticity of the demand curve is, in turn, a
function of the willingness of the taxpayer to substitute another item for the item being taxed.
The less willing a taxpayer is to substitute the item being taxed with another item, the less
elastic the item is and, as a result, the smaller the excess burden.
235. See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 319-20 (7th ed. 2005).
236. The context in which a consumption tax can tax savings is discussed supra text
accompanying notes 163-85.
237. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REVISITING THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 46 (1983)

(same); GRAVELLE, supra note 234, at 31 (making this point in the context of comparing a
consumption tax to an income tax); MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 18, at 451 (same).
238. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 18, at 451.

239. Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 4, at 1424.
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Their argument is based on deconstructing the income tax as a tax on
wages and as an additional tax on future consumption. They observe
that the tax on future consumption creates an excess burden by
distorting a taxpayer's choice between present consumption and
future consumption. They argue, however, that the tax on future
consumption also imposes an additional excess burden on work and
leisure because the taxpayer "knows that each hour of effort produces
fewer goods at the future date. '240 In contrast, a tax applied only to
consumption, while imposing a burden on the work-leisure decision,
does not distort the taxpayer's allocation between present and future
consumption. They argue that the sum of the excess burdens created
by an income tax has to be greater than the excess burden created by
the consumption tax. The logic is that if both taxes are collecting the
same amount of revenue, both are imposing the same burden on the
work-leisure decision. In addition, however, the income tax also is
imposing an excess burden on the consumption-savings decision
because it is distorting the taxpayer's choice between present and
future consumption.
Professors Bankman and Weisbach's analysis is correct for an
ideal consumption tax and income tax. Usually, one cannot count the
number of distortions created by tax systems to determine which is
most efficient. 24 1 The problem is that one distortion may offset the
other, 242 or the magnitude of the excess burdens may differ.2 43 It seems
unlikely, however, that the distortion of the work-leisure decision that
arises from taxing savings will offset the distortion of the work-leisure
decision attributable to taxing wages. The impact of a tax on work
may cause a taxpayer to work either more (the income effect) or less
(the substitution effect). No apparent reason accounts for why the
effect on the work-leisure decision of taxing wages should offset the
effect on the work-leisure decision of taxing savings for the same
taxpayer. Moreover, because Professors Bankman and Weisbach

240. Id.; see also Alan J. Auerbach, The Future of Fundamental Tax Reform, 87 AM. ECON.
REV. 143, 145 (1997) (arguing that the real tax burden on wages is a function of the tax burden
on savings as well as wages, where a taxpayer will be consuming in more than one period).
241. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New Welfare
Economics, in 2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 991, 1023 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin
Feldstein eds., 1987).
242. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifyingthe Role
of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821, 824 n.5
(2000).
243. The magnitude of the excess burdens will depend upon the tax elasticity of work for
leisure. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 237, at 46 (same); GRAVELLE, supra
note 234, at 31 (making this point in the context of comparing a consumption tax to an income
tax); MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 18, at 467 (same).
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assume that the amount of revenue collected would be the same, the
excess burden on the work-leisure decision should be the same under
the income tax and the consumption tax. Thus, in theory, the excess
burden of an income tax has to be greater than that of a consumption
tax because the income tax also imposes an excess burden on the
consumption-savings decision.
In the real world, however, the excess burden imposed by the
income tax may not be significantly greater than the burden created
by a consumption tax. The distortion of the work-leisure decision
contributed by the income tax's levy on savings may not be large.
Studies suggest that individuals irrationally tend to discount future
events in comparison to current events. 244 For example, consumers
may discount consumption deferred for one year by 30%, while
deferral beyond one year may only generate an additional 5%
discount. 245 This suggests that taxpayers do not save as much as they
246 If
should because they heavily discount the benefits from savings.
true, a taxpayer's decision to work may not be influenced by a tax on
savings because the taxpayer discounts the benefit of saving at an
irrationally high level.
There are additional reasons that the excess burden may not be
much greater for an income tax than a consumption tax. The excess
burden of the income tax may be lower than expected because
taxpayers rationally may discount the effect on wages of a tax on
savings because, at the time they earn wages, they may not know
whether or how much they will save. In contrast, the excess burden of
the consumption tax may be higher than expected because a tax that
applies only to wages will have to be higher than the current income
247
tax in order to make up for the revenue lost from not taxing savings.

244. David Laibson, Andrea Repetto & Jeremy Tobacman, Estimating Discount Functions
with Consumption Choices over the Lifecycle 4 (NBER, Working Paper No. 13314, 2005),
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl3314; David Laibson, Impatience and Savings, 2005 NBER REP. 6,
6, http://www.nber.org/reporter/fall05/fall05.pdf.
245. Laibson, Repetto & Tobacman, supra note 244, at 4.
246. David Laibson, Andrea Repetto & Jeremy Tobacman, Self Control and Saving for
Retirement, 1998 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 91, 95-96, have argued that the large
discount applied to a benefit to be received next year causes taxpayers to postpone savings. See
also Peter Diamond & Jerry Hausman, Individual Retirement and Investment Behavior, 87 J.
PUB. ECON. 81 (1984) (explaining the same phenomenon).
247. See ANTHONY B. ATKINSON & JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS 71,

564 (1980) (noting that a tax rate applied only to wages will have to be higher than a tax rate
applied to all forms of income in order to collect same amount of revenue); David F. Bradford,
The Economics of Tax Policy Toward Savings, in THE GOVERNMENT AND CAPITAL FORMATION 11,
15-19, 23-24 (George M. von Furstenberg ed., 1980) (same); Don Fullerton, The Consumption
Tax: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 27 TAX NOTES 435, 435 (1985) (same); Edward J.
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The higher tax on wages, coupled with the irrational tendency to
discount heavily savings or the rational discount of savings because of
uncertainty about the extent to which there will be any savings, may
mean that taxpayers would respond more strongly to the consumption
tax than they do to the income tax.
Empirical studies that have attempted to measure the
efficiency effects of moving from a progressive income tax to a
consumption tax have not considered the issues discussed above.
Nevertheless, the studies show that while, in theory, the move to a
consumption tax would result in major efficiency gains, such gains
disappear in the real world if transition relief is provided and the tax
is progressive. 248 Part of the difficulty is that the adoption of a
consumption tax will impose a burden on existing capital depending
on the form of tax. In a cash flow consumption tax, investment income
that has been taxed under an income tax will be taxed again when
consumed. Providing transition relief for these assets decreases the
efficiency of the consumption tax because it shifts the burden from
consumption using old capital (the holders of which may have a low
propensity to save) to new capital (the holders of which may have a
249
higher propensity to save).
In addition, if the form of consumption tax is progressive, the
2 50
efficiency gains of moving to a consumption tax may be reduced.
The formula for excess burden illustrates this point. The excess
burden is a function of the square of the tax exclusive tax rate. 251 A
progressive tax with an average rate equivalent to a proportional tax
always will have a larger excess burden than the proportional tax

McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1145, 1170
(1992) (same).
248. See, e.g., Auerbach, supra note 240, at 145 (observing that adoption of the USA Tax
System, described supra note 189, which would provide transition relief and maintain the same
degree of progressivity as the existing income tax, would not increase, and may decrease,
economic efficiency); Alan J. Auerbach, The Choice Between Income and Consumption Taxes: A
Primer 23-24
(NBER,
Working
Paper
No.
12307,
2006),
available
at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12307 ("Given the transition costs of moving from one tax system to
another, it could easily be the case that a small efficiency gain in moving to a consumption tax
could be outweighed by the transition costs of doing so.").
249. See, e.g., Eric M. Engen & William G. Gale, Consumption Taxes and Saving: The Role of
Uncertainty in Tax Reform, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 114, 114 (1997) (describing efficiency decreases
likely to occur in transition from an income tax to a consumption tax).
250. See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach, Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Jonathan Skinner, The Efficiency
Gains From Dynamic Tax Reform, 24 INT'L ECON. REV. 81, 97-98 (1983) (noting that a
progressive consumption tax that is assessed by taxing wages reduces efficiency).
251. See supra note 234 (citing sources that describe the excess burden as a function of the
elasticity of the demand curve and the square of the tax rate).
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because the rates are being squared. 25 2 It seems likely that a
consumption tax would be progressive, given the severely
disproportionate rates of consumption among the poor and wealthy.
As discussed earlier, a 2004 study found that families with income
over $200,000 consume only 37% of their income, while families with
2 53
income below $30,000 consume all of their income.
Given the uncertain efficiency costs and benefits, equity
concerns should determine the design of a tax system. If equality of
opportunity to participate in democracy and equality of opportunity
for self-realization are accepted as the appropriate equity goals of a
tax system, a progressive income tax is the better choice.
VI. CONCLUSION

Although consensus exists regarding the need for equity,
academics and policymakers have failed to agree about the best tax
system because we have ignored the necessity of first identifying
equity goals appropriate for a just government and then designing a
tax system to help achieve those goals. This Article proposes that the
principal equity goal underlying a just government is the creation of
equal opportunities for all citizens to achieve self-realization-that is,
to maximize their potential. It proposes, therefore, that a tax should
be designed to achieve equal opportunity for self-realization as one of
its principal goals. Viewing equal opportunity for self-realization as a
design issue leads to the identification of another foundational
principle: the promotion of democracy. Both political philosophy and
empirical literature indicate that equal access to the electoral process
and participation in the community has to exist for equal opportunity
for self-realization to exist. Designing a tax system to help achieve
these goals not only will increase equity, but it also may provide
efficiency gains that analysts have ignored.
To illustrate the importance of designing a tax system based on
these equity principles, this Article revisits the debate about the
desirability of an income tax versus a consumption tax. It argues that
a progressive income tax that limits loss deductions is better than an
ideal consumption tax in establishing the conditions for equal
opportunity for self-realization and democracy. A progressive income
tax that limits loss deductions burdens investment income, which is a
major source of political power. In contrast, a consumption tax cannot

252. See Auerbach, Kotliloff & Skinner, supra note 250, at 97 ("[F]or any single tax, the
magnitude of the distortion rises roughly in proportion to the square of the marginal tax rate.").
253. Burman & Kravitz, supra note 162, at 875.
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burden the disproportionate political power of the wealthy because it
only burdens investment income in narrow situations, and wealthy
individuals only consume a small percentage of their total income.
Although taxpayers can use certain portfolio adjustments to eliminate
the tax burden on investment income in an ideal income tax, they
have not done so in our actual income tax. This behavior may result
from taxpayer concern that, in our actual income tax, such portfolio
adjustments might decrease after-tax returns if loss limitations are
triggered or if tax rates change.
This Article also analyzes other aspects of the debate focusing
on the efficiency and equity claims for the two forms of taxes. The
efficiency claims for an ideal consumption tax versus our existing
income tax are overstated when viewed in the context of real world
systems that take into account taxpayer behavior and transition relief.
Given the uncertainty that there will be any efficiency gains (much
less large ones) from adopting a consumption tax in the real world, the
equity goals discussed herein should govern the selection of a tax
system. Such equity goals favor a progressive income tax that burdens
investment income.

Arbitration and Article III
Peter B. Rutledge
61 Vand. L. Rev. 1189 (2008)
This Article is part of a broader research agenda that studies
the relationship between arbitrationand constitutional law. Taking
its cue from the recent Canadian Softwood Lumber dispute over the
constitutionality of NAFTA's dispute resolution boards, this Article
asks a broader question: Why is arbitrationcompatible with Article
III? Under the traditionalaccount, when parties chose to arbitrate,
they waive their right to an Article III forum, thereby eliminating
any Article III issue. Accounts grounded in waiver, however, fail to
grapple adequately with the significant structural concerns
presented by arbitration. This Article defends the need for a more
robust theory, one that accounts for these structural concerns and
can address the novel constitutional challenges presented by a
variety of arbitral schemes, ranging from domestic employment
disputes to international commercial ones. Drawing on appellate
review theory, the Article proposes a bipolar matrix for assessing the
constitutionalityof arbitration-anapproach that comports with the
core principles of the theory and also enhances its explanatory value.
The Article concludes by applying this modified appellate review
theory to a variety of contexts in arbitration law, including
internationalcommercial arbitrationand NAFTA arbitration.

